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ABSTRACT 
 
More people decide to vote when the race is close than when it is not. This is arguably the most 
consistent finding in aggregate-level research on turnout. However, studies in recent years using 
multilevel analysis consistently tend not to find any such link at the individual-level. My 
motivation for this thesis was to uncover the reason for this puzzling inconsistency. I argue that 
closeness indeed can affects the decision to vote, but that this effect is contingent and indirect. 
The changes in aggregate turnout is the result of different mechanisms affecting different people 
in different situations. In this endeavor, instead of asking if closeness of elections affects the 
decision to vote, I therefore ask, for whom might it do so? 
 
I use several theories from across the social sciences, and propose five different hypotheses for 
whom closeness might count and why that is. I hypothesize that (i) although closeness of 
election only affect those without a habit of voting; (ii) it fuels cognitive engagement for those 
that are interested in the election; and (iii) it fuels interest in the election for those who are 
educated or (iv) feel close to a particular party. In general, it should (v) affect the decision to 
vote indirectly through interest in the election. To test these hypotheses I use multilevel 
regression models and mediation analysis on cross-national survey data from the Comparative 
Study of Electoral System. I calculate closeness of election in a novel way so that it is 
comparable across different electoral systems. The complete data set includes 35,913 
respondents from legislative elections in 26 countries between 2006 and 2011. Although too 
inconclusive for hypothesis v, the empirical analysis lend clear support for hypotheses i-iv. 
Indeed, the regression models indicate no statistically significant relationship when looking at 
the mean; only when controlling for the right things and looking in the right place do we see 
how closeness may help shape political behavior. The results clearly supports the notion that 
closeness of elections can affect the decision to vote, for some people in some situations. This 
contributes to an empirical foundation and understanding for the role of closeness of election 
in shaping turnout. It also highlights how combining different theoretical approaches can help 
uncover the more complex ways in which different factors interact in shaping political 
participation.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electoral participation is a core subject of political science and the question of who votes and 
why have received unabated attention. This attention has been growing over the last few 
decades following the decline of turnout in established democracies (Franklin, 2004; Norris, 
2004). Because of its centrality to the rational choice approach to voting, the perhaps most 
studied element in this enterprise has been closeness of election (Geys, 2006: 645). The 
closeness of an election is the uncertainty of the outcome when people have the opportunity to 
vote. It is expected that the closer the election the more probable it is that people will decide to 
vote. The literature have two general explanations for this relationship: In the rational choice 
framework of Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968), the instrumental benefit of 
voting is essentially the ability to affect the outcome. Since the probability of any single voter 
affecting the outcome is greater in a closer election, more people should decide to vote. This 
has been called the “Downsian Closeness Hypothesis” (Matsusaka and Palda, 1993) or simply 
the “decision hypothesis”. The second is the “mobilization hypothesis”. Following the work of  
Key (1949) and Denver and Hands (1974) stating that a closer election provoke more campaign 
efforts by political elites, Cox and Munger (1989) and Kirchgässner and Schulz (2005) argue 
that these mobilization effort in turn increase turnout (Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999). In other 
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words, closeness of election is expected to affect turnout either directly by altering the voters’ 
probability of affecting the outcome or indirectly by increasing the mobilization efforts by 
elites. 
 
Closeness of election matters because it is a forever moving electoral institution; the very 
competitiveness of elections; the dynamic temporal dimension of elections able to shape the 
decision to participate, whose nature varies by the characteristics of the electoral and party 
system. It has been a key component in explaining variation in voter turnout both empirically 
and theoretically. Aggregate-level research consistently find that turnout is higher in closer 
elections (Geys, 2006;  see also Matsusaka and Palda, 1993; Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; 
Franklin, 2004). This is generally regarded as the most robust finding in the voter turnout 
literature (Geys, 2006: 645). Some scholars have even stated that they “cannot see how this 
finding could be wrong” (Blais, 2006: 119). Franklin (2004: 206) goes as far as to argue that to 
understand the decline in turnout in established democracies, one must only look at the 
character of elections—putting emphasis on closeness of election—not the character of voters. 
However, although this aggregate-level evidence might seem compelling, it alone does not 
create enough leverage to make any reliable inference about individual-level behavior per se. 
We need individual-level analysis in order to map an empirical foundation for the relationship 
between close elections and turnout. This has been possible in recent years following the advent 
of multilevel statistical techniques within the social sciences (e.g., Bühlmann and Freitag, 2006; 
Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Hadjar and Beck, 2010; Hobolt et al., 2009; Kittilson and Anderson, 
2011; Söderlund et al., 2011; Singh, 2011b, 2011a; Persson, 2012). This growing individual-
level research, however, consistently tend not to find any link between the closeness of an 
election and the decision to vote (Smets and Ham, 2013: 12). As a result, there seems to be a 
rather disconcerting and puzzling inconsistency in the empirical literature. Although we know 
that more people tend to vote in a closer election, we lack an empirical foundation for why that 
might be. My motivation for this thesis was to uncover the reasons for this puzzling 
inconsistency. 
 
At the outset, this inconsistency might be either one of two things. The theoretical arguments 
could simply be incorrect and the findings at the aggregate-level are due to some flaw in the 
method or the data. More likely, however, is that closeness of election do affect the decision to 
vote, but that this effect is contingent and indirect. If we assume that closeness of election only 
affects a certain group of people and only in some specific context. Then Individual-level 
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regression models not accounting for such dependencies will not find any relationship between 
closeness and voting when looking at the mean. However, aggregate-level regression models 
are able to notice the slight change in the total amount of people turning out in a close election 
as compared to one that is not. Indeed, Blais and Dobrzynska (1998), in a very renowned study 
of aggregate-level turnout, finds that a change of ten percentage points in the vote share between 
the winner of an election and the runner up only change the total amount of people turning out 
with about one or two points. So to uncover the reason for this aforementioned inconsistency, 
instead of asking if closeness of election do or do not affect the decision to vote, I ask: 
 
For whom may the closeness of the election affect the decision to vote and why might 
that be? 
 
The multitude of theoretical explanations of political participation that have found empirical 
support highlight the fact there is no single causal mechanism or core explanation of electoral 
participation (Gallego, 2010; Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009; Smets and Ham, 2013). 
Therefore, in a slight departure from much of this literature, I do not aim to compare contextual 
and individual variables in a race to predict turnout. Instead, I conceptualize the relationship 
between closeness of election and voting by distinguishing between supply- and demand-side 
factors of participation and focusing on how they work together (Kittilson and Anderson, 2011; 
Söderlund et al., 2011). To do this, I try to use theories from across the social sciences, including 
the developmental framework of voting, the resource model of participation and the heuristic-
systematic model of information processing  
 
To test these hypotheses I use multilevel regression models and mediation analysis on cross-
national survey data from module 3 of the Comparative Study of Electoral System (CSES, 
2013). The data set includes 35,913 respondents from legislative elections in 26 countries 
between 2006 and 2011. In order to measure closeness of election in way that is comparable 
across election systems I combine the district- and national-level margin of victory. The most 
common measure of district-level closeness in the literature is the margin between the two 
largest parties. This have no intuitive counterpart in multiparty systems using proportional 
representation where several electoral seats are contest simultaneously. For the district-level, I 
compute the margin of victory between the winner and runner up exclusively for the marginal 
seat. I then combine this with the national-level margin, measured as the margin between the 
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winning and losing bloc. The results of the analysis clearly supports the notion that closeness 
of election can affect the decision to vote, for some people in some situations.  
 
1.1 Relevance and contribution 
Understanding who votes and why is important. Elections are usually viewed as a key element 
of democracy, and phenomenon’s like declining turnout rates (Franklin, 2004; Norris, 2004; 
Dalton, 2008) and unequal participation (Lijphart, 1997) are potential challenges to 
representative democracy. Furthermore, less competitive elections is often argued to be the 
source of the decline in turnout in advanced democracies (Franklin, 2004; Franklin et al., 2004; 
Johnston et al., 2006; see also Blais and Rubenson, 2013). It is then not surprising that trying 
to understand how closeness of election affects individual-level turnout is not a particularly 
novel endeavor. The recent advancements in multilevel techniques have allowed scholars to 
examine individual- and aggregate-level factors, as well as cross-level interactions, 
simultaneously, which have fostered an increasing amount of literature taking this approach 
(e.g. Birch, 2010; Bühlmann and Freitag, 2006; Söderlund et al., 2011; Kittilson and Anderson, 
2011; Hadjar and Beck, 2010; Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Blais and Rubenson, 2013; Tawfik et al., 
2012; Górecki, 2011; Hobolt et al., 2009; Persson, 2013; Gallego, 2010; Singh, 2011a, 2011b). 
 
Nevertheless, this study contributes to the turnout literature both empirically and theoretically. 
This is a novel approach to the study of closeness and voting, as very few studies of voter 
turnout even discuss or account for these types of conditional effects empirically or theoretically 
(with exceptions of course, e.g., Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009; Gallego, 2010; Kittilson and 
Anderson, 2011; Söderlund et al., 2011). In addition, this thesis emphasize the importance of 
measuring closeness of election correctly. Especially how closeness varies also in systems with 
proportional representation when combing the district- and national-level margin of victory. 
None (to my knowledge) has examined closeness of election and turnout at the individual-level 
at this scale while using an appropriate measure of closeness. The results contribute to an 
empirical foundation and understanding for the role of closeness of election in shaping turnout. 
In addition, much of the existing literature on voter turnout is often underspecified theoretically 
by only using a single theoretical framework at a time (Smets and Ham, 2013). I show that 
combining different theories can help uncover the more complex ways in which different 
factors interact in shaping political participation. In this case, it especially highlights the role of 
habit in shaping the role of context, and the role of context in shaping the role of interest.  
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2. THEORY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I present the theory and hypotheses. I have tried to organize this chapter so that 
it follows my main argument about the inconsistency in the literature and the conditional effect 
of closeness in a logical manner. Firstly, to lay the foundation, I define the closeness of an 
election. After that, I briefly elaborate on the empirical inconsistency between aggregate- and 
individual-level studies regarding close elections. My point is not conduct a literary review, but 
to provide the facts behind this assertion. Thirdly, I present the theoretical framework. This is 
to clarify my rational and motive in approaching this subject theoretically. Lastly, I present each 
hypothesis in turn. My first hypothesis is about the role of habit. I present this first because, I 
argue, this contingent relationship is applicable to my other hypotheses. The next hypothesis 
proposes how the closeness of election might affect the decision to vote for those with a lot of 
interest in the election directly. My next two hypothesis uses the mobilization hypothesis (a 
common hypothesis in the literature on close elections and turnout) as background, and propose 
two different ways in which close elections might increase interest in the election. The last 
hypothesis is the most general, proposing that closeness of election should affect the decision 
to vote indirectly via interest in the election.  
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2.1 The closeness of an election 
 
The closeness of an election is the uncertainty of the outcome of the election prior to the actual 
results being known 2F. In other words, a close election is one where there is no clear winner at 
the point(s) in time when people have the opportunity to vote. It is an intrinsic component of 
the electoral competition; many scholars even call it the competitiveness of the election. 
Conceptually, we could say that it ranges from a lower bound where the outcome is the most 
certain and an upper bound where the outcome is the most uncertain. This is not unambiguous, 
however. Firstly, “uncertainty” can be the actual uncertainty of the election, i.e. how many votes 
that determined the outcome, or it can be the uncertainty from the perspective of a particular 
person, i.e. whether he or she perceive it to be close. Secondly, “outcome” can mean both the 
outcome for a particular party, i.e. how many seats they win in parliament (or in some specific 
constituency), or the outcome of the election as a whole, i.e. which party or coalition wins the 
majority and hence the executive. Hence, closeness vary by both by perspective and outcome 
(see Figure 1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Different types of closeness of election 
 
 
Perspective determines the scope of closeness. Objective closeness is the actual and numerically 
measurable closeness of election, while subjective closeness is how close voters perceive it to 
be. Earlier individual-level research do not distinguish between the two, and subsequently used 
the “self-reported” closeness (e.g. Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). I am interested in how the 
electoral context affects voter behavior. Closeness of election is a property of elections, which 
Party 
Overall 
Objective Subjective 
Perspective 
O
u
tc
o
m
e 
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is why it is of such interest: It is a property of the election that can vary a lot. The voter’s 
perception of closeness—and how that perception alters their behavior—is only a, not the part 
of this. For example, the mobilization hypothesis assumes that closeness affects the decision to 
vote via indirect mechanisms (e.g. altering information costs and increasing social pressure) 
independent from ones individual perception of closeness. When using a subjective measure 
we assume closeness itself to be something affected by the context, instead of being a part of 
it. Even if that is of interest, an individual’s perception of closeness is prone to be confounded 
by other variables of interest, like the level of information, social capital, perception of civic 
duty, and so on. Separating the effect of closeness from other thing would be difficult. In short, 
there are both theoretical and empirical reasons for taking an objective perspective when 
studying how closeness affects the decision to vote.  
 
The “outcome” dimension specifies what part of the election that is actually close. The election 
can be very close for a specific party, e.g. because it is about to fall under or over the legal 
threshold of exclusion or lose or win a parliamentary seat, while the overall race for the majority 
(and hence executive) already is a foregone conclusion. The race for the marginal seat in a 
district can be very close between some parties, but not all. The unit of analysis in this case is 
voters, not parties. The intricate relationship between closeness of election and the decision to 
vote does not limit itself to the relationship between a voter and his/her favored party. On the 
contrary, it extends to several indirect effects imposed by the general context in which the 
decision is made. Even if the outcome of some voters favored party is very certain, the situation 
for other parties might be very different, both nationally and locally. Untangling and properly 
weighting the uncertainty for each party in relation to each other could yield an interesting 
measure, but it will come at the cost of complexity. A more parsimonious approach is to focus 
on the overall objective closeness of the election. 
 
2.1.1 Measuring closeness across electoral systems 
I have three general points on the measuring of electoral systems; (i) the data, (ii) the level of 
measurement and (iii) the operationalization. Firstly (i), somewhat paradoxically, measuring 
the actual objective uncertainty is impossible (because it is uncertain). The most intuitive proxy 
would be pre-election information like opinion polls, media coverage and previous election 
results 4F. However, so-called ex ante information is difficult to attain and measure, especially at 
the district-level. There is virtually no alternative to using so-called ex post election information 
in comparative research. The virtue of post-election data is that closeness can be accurately 
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calculated. However, this measure will always be biased because it does not account for the 
changes in closeness caused by itself (or other things for that matter) right before the election. 
Still, for this analysis I use post-election data. 
 
Secondly (ii), the overall outcome can be calculated either at the district- or national-level. It is 
most common to measure closeness at the national-level, but there have recently been an 
increase in studies arguing that district-level closeness is more suitable (e.g. Blais and Lago, 
2009; Grofman and Selb, 2009; Selb, 2009; Franklin, 2004). Blais and Lago (2009), for 
example, argues that it is more appropriate to measure the race in the district because it is 
possible for the national race to be a foregone conclusion while parties are still fighting for a 
seat in the district. This is obviously correct. However, my argument is that closeness at the 
national-level also matters. The overall uncertainty of the election is a product of the level of 
closeness at both the district- and the national-level, no matter which outcome is in focus. An 
election is always the most close when both the district-level race and the national-level race is 
close at the same time. Conversely, an election is always the least close when both the district-
level race and the national-level race is the most certain at the same time. I therefore measure 
closeness of election as the mean between the district- and national-level closeness.  
 
Thirdly (iii), measuring closeness of election in a way that allows comparison across different 
types of electoral systems is no trivial endeavor, especially across different formulas. Franklin 
(2004), for example, simply code countries with proportional representation as “0”, assuming 
they have perfect competition.  The standard measure used in plurality election is the difference 
in votes (or vote share) between the winner and the runner-up. This have no self-evident 
equivalent in systems with proportional representation where several electoral seats are 
contested simultaneously. Recently, both Grofman and Selb (2009),  Selb (2009) and Blais and 
Lago (2009) argue that closeness of election also varies within PR systems at the district-level, 
and that this is important. Grofman and Selb (2009) proposes an excellent measure of district 
competitiveness, but it is only applicable to d’Hondt systems. Blais and Lago (2009) proposes 
to measure district-level closeness as the minimal amount of votes required for any party to win 
one additional seat, but this would be very difficult to compute with the available data. Selb 
(2009), however, uses a compelling measure of the district-level margin in way that is 
comparable across different systems and relatively easy to compute: He uses the margin of 
victory between the winner and runner up exclusively for the marginal seat. In a plurality single 
member districts this is equivalent to the margin of victory between the leading and second 
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party, but it also have an intuitive counterpart in PR multi-member districts. Although he only 
applies it to election system using the highest fraction method (d’Hondt and Sainte-Laguë), I 
also adapt to systems using largest remainder (Droop and Hare quota) in order to have a wider 
sample. Although sophisticated measures of district-level closeness have been introduced in the 
literature over the recent years, there is no standard of cross-national measure of closeness at 
the national-level. The national-level margin is measured simply as the margin between the 
winning and losing bloc. That it is, the number of votes cast for the winning “bloc” minus the 
number cast for the loosing “bloc”. 
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2.2 The inconsistency in empirical literature on close elections and turnout 
 
Studying if closeness of election affects voter turnout is in no way a novel endeavor. Closeness 
is frequently regarded as the most studied element in the voter turnout literature (Geys, 2006: 
647). In his 2006 meta-analysis of 83 empirical aggregate-level studies, Geys (2006) lists 52 
that includes some kind of measure of closeness. In this section, I briefly discuss the 
inconsistency between individual- and aggregate-level studies on closeness of election. 
 
The link between closeness and turnout is often considered as the most consistent finding in the 
empirical literature on voter turnout (Blais, 2006: 119; Geys, 2006: 647), to the point where 
some “cannot see how this finding could be wrong” (Blais, 2006: 119). Even some classic texts 
have emphasized this relationship. Key (1949), in his study of turnout in the Southern U.S 
during the early twentieth century, stress the role of closeness for increasing turnout. Several 
scholars since then have similarly attributed low turnout rates (e.g. Felchner, 2008; Kelley et 
al., 1967; Teixeira, 1992; Wattenberg, 2002), especially declining rates over time (e.g. 
Burnham, 1965; Franklin, 2004; see also Blais and Rubenson, 2013), to the lack of closeness. 
In their meta-analyses of aggregate-level research, Geys (2006) and Matsusaka and Palda 
(1993) finds that 69 and 70 percent of the studies they analyze, respectively, found a positive 
relationship between closeness and turnout (see Table 2). More recently, for example, several 
studies have used elections with a two-level ballot system to test closeness more accurately 
(Indridason, 2008; Garmann, 2014; Simonovits, 2012; Fauvelle-Aymar and François, 2006; De 
Paola and Scoppa, 2013). By using district-level data from the first round to measure the expect 
closeness in the second round, they all find this same tendency. In all aggregate-level studies, 
however, the magnitude of the effect is always found to be quite small. Blais and Dobrzynska 
(1998), in a very renowned study of aggregate-level turnout, suggests that a ten point change in 
the percentage points between the winner of the election and the runner up only increase turnout 
by one or two points.  
 
However, the story is very different in individual-level research. Only 35 percent of the 
individual-level studies using a national-level measure of closeness in Smets and Ham (2013) 
meta-analysis finds the same relationship. None of the individual-level studies using district-
level measures of closeness found any link. This tendency for individual-level studies to come 
up short on the matter have led many to question the validity of aggregate-level findings. 
Matsusaka and Palda (1993) suggests that the findings at the aggregate-level is simply due to 
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ecological fallacy (Cho et al., 2008; Robinson, 1950). Other scholars have pointed out problems 
related to how closeness of election often is measured. Cox (1988), for example, argues that 
when closeness is measured by percentage margins at the national-level, part of the turnout 
measure (i.e. dependent variable) appears in the closeness measure (i.e. independent variable), 
since both is partially calculated from the total number of cast votes. This, he argues, means 
that any correlation found might be spurious. 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of aggregate- and individual-level studies on close elections and turnout. 
Study and 
scope 
Level of analysis Variable Successes/ 
Failures/ 
Anomalies 
Success 
rate (%) 
Effect 
size  
(rav) 
Modal 
category Turnout 
measure 
Closeness 
measure 
Geys (2006), 
1968-2004 
Aggregate-
level  
Either 
Tests (343) 206/137/19 56.91 0.58* Success 
Studies (52) 36/16/- 69.23 0.69* Success 
Matsusaka and 
Palda (1993),  
1973-1989 
Tests (49) 35/9/3 71.43 - Success 
Studies (23) 16/6/1 69.57 - Success 
Smets and 
Ham (2013), 
2000-2010 
Individual-
level 
National-
level 
Tests (51) 15/36/0 29.41 0.29*** Failure 
Studies (20) 7/13/0 35.00 0.36** Failure 
District-
level 
Tests (13) 0/13/0 0.00 0.00 Failure 
Studies (3) 0/3/0 0.00 0.00 Failure 
*** p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05.  
Note: The tested hypothesis is a positive relationship between closeness and turnout (i.e. a closer election generates 
higher turnout). Success rate = (successes/number of tests)*100. A test is an anomaly if the coefficient is 
statistically significant but in the opposite direction of the hypothesis. Mean effect size (rav) = sum of ri /number 
of studies where r = (successes – anomalies)/number of tests. Modal category is “success” if the majority of tests 
are a success and “failure” otherwise. See sources for more details. 
Source: Meta-analysis data of aggregate-level studies are from Geys (2006: 646) and Matsusaka and Palda (1993: 
858-859), and meta-analysis data of individual-level studies are from Smets and Ham (2013: 13). 
 
 
There was few individual-level studies examining the relationship between closeness and 
turnout prior to the introduction of multilevel regression models. Those that exists, e.g. Riker 
and Ordeshook (1968), Ashenfelter and Kelley Jr (1975) and Blais (2000), uses subjective 
measures based on survey questions. These studies typically find a statistically significant 
relationship between closeness and turnout, but this type of measure problematic because it 
does not measure the effect of closeness per se (see 2.1). District-level measures of closeness 
(with individual-level units of analysis) were introduced by Matsusaka and Palda (1993, 1999), 
but they use inappropriate statistical models.  
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2.3 Theoretical framework: Closeness and horseshoes 
 
Almost 40 years ago, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1975: 920) declared that “closeness counts only in 
horseshoes and dancing”. Indeed, this seems like a reasonable explanation for the 
aforementioned inconsistency.  
 
 When does closeness counts? < Horseshoes!  
  < Dancing!  
 
A problem with much of aggregate-level literature on closeness of election and turnout is how 
it relates the context with the individual. The underlying model of behavior behind some of 
these studies implicitly assumes a direct macro-micro link (e.g., Franklin, 2004; Powell Jr, 
1986; Jackman, 1987). For example, Franklin (2004; 1996: 321) explicitly argues that the 
institutional context constitute the boundaries within which individual-level characteristics can 
play a role. The presumption is that the context directly shapes the costs and incentives of 
participation. In some sense, this amounts to a linear and deterministic ontological view of 
political behavior. The supply- versus demand-side factor framework of Kittilson and Anderson 
(2011), on the other hand, seems like a more promising approach. When analyzing the 
relationship between efficacy and voting they argue that electoral institutions works as supply 
of opportunity, shaping the costs and benefits of participation (Kittilson and Anderson, 2011). 
They separate between the contingent and indirect effect of the electoral supply on political 
behavior. Instead of weighting macro- and micro-level factors against each other, one should 
examine how supply- and demand-side factors interact in shaping political behavior. In other 
words, instead of asking if closeness of election affects the decision to vote, we should ask how 
and when. Or in this case, I ask for whom. So to understand close elections and turnout, all we 
need to do is to find the horseshoes. This is my first point of departure. For whom does closeness 
count? 
 
The theoretical literature on political participation is vast and takes on different philosophical 
approaches to human social behavior. Albeit the extensiveness of this literature, there still exists 
no core theory of voter turnout. In its stead, we have many different theoretical explanations, 
all with some degree of empirical support. As Smets and Ham (2013: 2) notes, this “[…] points 
to the possibility that multiple causal mechanisms explain turnout and that different causal 
mechanisms may be prominent for different voters or in different contexts.” This is my second 
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point of departure. Instead of applying the “usual models” of turnout (i.e. some form of rational 
choice theory), or try to come up with an all-encompassing master explanation of this 
phenomena, I test five hypothesis for when closeness might count. More specifically, I lean on 
a social-psychological approach to political participation. I try to combine the developmental 
framework of voting, the heuristic-systematic model of information processing and the resource 
model of participation. I also rely on the mobilization hypothesis already proposed in the 
literature. Each hypothesis is designed so that they rely on different mechanisms, while the 
theories still overlap. My rationale is this: If closeness of election affects the decision to vote 
via different mechanisms for different people, then we should find empirical support for 
different mechanisms for different people. The central theme is how closeness of election 
interacts with habit and interest. In the rest of the chapter, I present the hypotheses I derived 
from taking this approach in turn. 
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2.4 Close elections and the habit of voting 
 
Any effect of closeness of election on the act of voting is conditional on the habit of voting. 
The concept of habit can broadly be defined “as psychological dispositions to repeat past 
behavior” (Neal et al., 2012: 492). The important role of habit in the context of turnout have 
long been stressed (e.g. Milbrath, 1965; Brody and Sniderman, 1977). In a very famous article 
in the turnout literature, Plutzer (2002) outlined what he called a developmental framework for 
understanding turnout. He argued that much of the mixed results in the literature would make 
more sense when considering the development of the habit of voting. Key to this framework is 
the idea of inertia: the longer citizen’s do or do not vote repeatedly, the higher propensity they 
have for settling into the habit of doing the same next time around. This idea of voting or not 
in the past itself increasing the probability of voting again in the future have been tested many 
times (Kanazawa, 1998, 2000; Green and Shachar, 2000; Gerber et al., 2003; Fowler, 2006; 
Cutts et al., 2009; Denny and Doyle, 2009; Meredith, 2009; Dinas, 2012; Fujiwara et al., 2013). 
It is also the backdrop of Franklin’s (2004) argument about the importance of the electoral 
context. He argues that the electoral supply is one of the most important factors for young 
people that have not yet gained the habit of voting. Hence, for him it inadvertently affects if 
they get the habit of voting. The shifting temporal trend of aggregate-level turnout is then 
merely the sum of the proportion in each new generation that gained the habit of voting, which 
varies as the context varies.  
 
However, I think this idea of inertia where also not participating increases the propensity to not 
vote next time, is somewhat misguided (Aldrich et al., 2011; Cravens, 2013). In social-
psychology the idea of habit is more often described as the development of automaticity based 
on learned associations between context and responses (Ouellette and Wood, 1998; Verplanken 
et al., 1997; Verplanken and Aarts, 1999; Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2000). The development of 
habit is a gradual process. It requires repetition over time within the same context for the 
association between context and response to form in memory (Wood and Neal, 2007, 2009; 
Neal et al., 2012). For rare events, like blood donation (Masser et al., 2008), habit has been 
linked to identity-related factors (Verplanken and Orbell, 2003). Voting becomes habitual over 
time as it is associated more and more with psychological rewards and becomes more central 
to one’s identity (Verplanken and Orbell, 2003). For example, the increased content and pride 
from complying with social norms, and being able to call oneself “a voter”. In addition, once 
someone overcomes their initial predisposition to stay home, the inertia increases substantially 
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initially because of the decreased cost. The more often someone vote the more familiar the 
process will be. For example, uncertainty around and effort to get information about the parties, 
how to register, where to meet, how the process at the voting booth works and so on, is lower. 
This means that the anxiety for going to the polls is much lower. However, not voting have no 
such mechanism. The cost remains the same and there is no association of psychological reward 
or identity that can be triggered in memory. In other words, the habit of voting is a gradual 
process for those that do vote.  
 
For those that do have a (degree of) habit of voting, when the election comes, the response of 
voting is likely to be activated, and other responses deactivated (Mc Culloch et al., 2008). From 
this, people may act on the first response that comes to mind as an ideomotor effect (Bargh, 
1999). In other words, a habitual voter may vote simply as a reflex, without considering the act 
and then make a decision. It is not that a habitual voter necessarily does it on pure reflex per se; 
they may consciously decide to override the idea and do something else. However, making 
novel decision always require more effort because the already established pattern of responses 
must be overwritten (Quinn et al., 2010; Neal et al., 2006). In other words, by having voted 
repeatedly in the past they may vote again, simply because it is easier than making a decision 
not to. The habit of voting therefore work as a “buffer” for decision-making. The higher the 
degree of habit, the less likely it is that the decision is a consciously evaluated one. This why 
the notion of inertia fits very well, once we only regard inertia for those that do vote. The 
propensity for these mechanisms to work in this way would always rise as the electoral 
experience rises, so it is difficult to set any definite dividing line for when someone is a habitual 
voter. Even Milbrath (1965: 31) in his seminal work regarded it is as concept of reinforcement, 
where the strength of habit characterize the habitual voting. 
 
 
2.4.1 Hypothesis 1: The habit of voting as a buffer for the decision to vote 
In order for habit to form, a stable context is need. In this sense the context is crucial to the 
developmental model of turnout. Closeness of election might play an import role in this regard, 
as Franklin (2004) argues. However, I am not interested in the habit-formation per se. I am 
interested in when closeness matters, or more specifically, for who. Because the habit of voting 
can levitate the decision to vote, this is a natural place to start. My central hypothesis, then, is 
that closeness only counts for people without the habit of voting. In other words, I do not regard 
the electoral supply as the one shaping the incentives and cost of participating, but rather the 
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psychological boundaries as the one shaping the role of the electoral supply. Again, this 
relationship is of course much more complicated. Habit-formation’s most heavy dependence is 
the performance context, of which also closeness can play a role. However, whom closeness 
can make a difference for when it comes to voting, are primarily those without any 
predisposition do so regardless. Causally speaking, I expect the habit of voting to moderate the 
relationship between closeness of election and voting, i.e. a contingent effect. Hence, I 
formulate the hypothesis as: 
 
Hypothesis 1 The habit of voting moderates the effect of closeness of election on voting 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Hypothesis 1, the effect of closeness of election is moderated by habit 
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2.5 Close elections and cognitive engagement 
 
Individuals with an interest in the election should invest more cognitive effort in a closer 
election because of accuracy-motivation induced by uncertainty. I would argue that the level of 
uncertainty in the election should affect the way citizen’s process election-relevant information 
at a cognitive level. In short, they should be more cognitively engaged. Consider the heuristic-
systematic model (HSM) of information processing in social psychology (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; 
Chaiken et al., 1989; Chen et al., 1996; Chen and Chaiken, 1999): The HSM model maintains 
that people develop their opinions and beliefs by using either or both systematic or heuristic 
ways of processing information. Systematic processing is the use of decision-relevant 
information. When using systematic processing, individuals are more cognitively engaged 
because they carefully analyze the available information in order to make up their mind about 
something. It involves the detailed analysis of structure and quality of an argument. Systematic 
processing therefore require a lot of cognitive effort. Heuristic processing, on the other hand, 
requires much less effort. When using heuristic processing, individuals process the information 
quickly based on so-called judgmental rules—the set of knowledge structures that are already 
stored in memory—and assign a judgment. These judgmental rules are predetermined based on 
the conclusions that have worked in past; like cognitive shortcuts developed from prior 
experience which easily can be used to evaluate new information (Smith, 1984). In this sense, 
heuristic processing requires little attention to the actual incoming contextual information. 
Judging the information—what party to vote for, which party will win, and so on—does not 
require any complex thought, because individuals simply assign it the same meaning as they 
had before without investing any effort. 
 
What induces heuristic versus systematic processing? Firstly, all-else equal, individuals will try 
to exert the least amount of effort making a decision or forming an opinion (Shugan, 1980; 
Cacioppo et al., 1996; see also e.g., Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Basinger and Lavine, 2005; 
Lavine et al., 2012). Secondly, individuals will want to be sufficiently confidence in that they 
have made the right decision (Fiske and Taylor, 2013: 15; see also e.g., Basinger and Lavine, 
2005; Lavine et al., 2012). In other words, people will tend to use heuristic processing as much 
as possible, unless they for some reasons feel the need to be more certain. Why should closeness 
of election matter for people with interest in the election? Because the uncertainty of the election 
should alter the degree of confidence needed for the decision to be sufficient. This is the 
accuracy-motivation: Individuals will engage in the necessary cognitive processing in order to 
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be sure they made the right decision (or opinion) in an uncertain situation. The notion that 
individuals are drawn to resolve uncertainty is not a new one (e.g., Kagan, 1972), and 
uncertainty is linked to increased systematic processing in many ways (e.g., Weary and 
Jacobson, 1997; Loewenstein, 1994; Tiedens and Linton, 2001). In elections that are not close, 
most individuals that are interested in the election probably do not engage in much systematic 
processing, and simply rely on heuristics for most incoming information. When the race is 
close, however, because it is uncertain, it should have a tendency to fuel more systematic 
processing and hence more cognitive effort.  
 
Consider a sport example, which is more intuitive: People consume sport for many reasons, 
including team affiliation, social facilitation, self-actualization and so on (Milne and 
McDonald, 1999: 23-26). For example, someone watching a football game with interest. Their 
interest is high and they indeed sought out information. However, the degree of cognitive 
engagement will still vary depending on the game. Crucially, how much cognitive effort that is 
exerted in analyzing and making up opinions during the game will vary depending on how 
exciting and uncertain it is.  For example, most people will probably exert more cognitive effort 
in an exciting game on overtime, than in one that is a “blowout” from start. 
 
 
Figure 3: Hypothesis 2, closeness of election affects voters that are interested in the election and that does 
not have the habit of voting 
 
 
2.5.1 Hypothesis 2: Uncertainty and those interested in the election 
My second hypothesis builds on this framework in a simple way: Closeness of election should 
have an impact on those that already have shown an interest, e.g. sought information about the 
election. This is because, on average, they should have invested more cognitive effort in a closer 
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election. The assumption is that those who already have an interest in the election—for 
whatever reason—have a high propensity to vote in the first place (see e.g., Rubenson et al., 
2004; Denny and Doyle, 2008). The extra effort and excitement because of the closer election 
should be enough to make those that otherwise would not vote overcome their initial inclination 
to stay home. In addition, the habit of voting should still act as moderator. Both regarding 
whether a closer election translates into more cognitive effort, and whether more cognitive 
effort translates into a higher probability of voting. I therefore expect the effect of closeness on 
turnout to be moderated by both information seeking and habit, i.e. a contingent effect (Figure 
3). Hence, I formulate the hypothesis as:  
 
 
Hypothesis 2 Closeness of election affects the decision to vote for people that are 
interested in the election and do not have a habit of voting 
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2.6 The mobilization hypothesis and interest in the election 
 
The primary hypothesis proposed in the literature is the mobilization hypothesis1. It argues that 
closeness of election affects elite actors’ incentive to mobilize, which in turn affect turnout. In 
other words, although it argues that the effect is indirect via mobilization, it also argues that 
there is a direct relationship from mobilization to the decision to vote. I will first present the 
mobilization hypothesis. This is important because in hypothesis 3 and 4 I assume it to be 
“true”. After that, I present my hypothesis for who this should matter for. My first argument is 
that closeness of elections—in light of the mobilization hypothesis—should primarily matter 
for interest in the election. Therefore, much of the effect of closeness of election on turnout 
should be (more) indirect. 
 
The mobilization hypothesis states that closeness of election increase mobilization, which in 
turn increase turnout (see e.g. Cox, 1999; Denver and Hands, 1974; Key, 1949; Kirchgässner 
and Schulz, 2005). In other words, closeness of election does not affect voters, but rather 
“pivotal elites” (Cox, 1999; Cox and Munger, 1989), “pivotal leaders” (Shachar and Nalebuff, 
1999) and/or “strategic politicians” (Aldrich, 1993). My interpretation is as follows: Closeness 
of election can both increase and focus partisan mobilization efforts, which in turn increase 
turnout by potentially reducing information costs, promoting interest in the campaign and 
increasing social pressure. The first assumption of this is that closeness affects mobilization. 
This, in turn, reasonably assumes that elites (e.g. politicians) are inherently strategic in their 
mobilization efforts, and that they adapt to the nature of the competition (see e.g. Rosenstone 
and Hansen, 1993). One might therefore expect closeness of election to affect elites, because 
they will perceive mobilization efforts to have a higher probability of being important in a close 
election. This means that closeness can affect partisan mobilization efforts in two different 
ways, a distinction the existing literature usually fails to make. Firstly, close elections might 
drive parties to increase the pool of resources available in the campaign, i.e. increasing fund-
                                                 
1 The “decision” hypothesis is the other standard hypothesis proposed in the literature. It simply states that people 
are more prone to vote in close elections because their chances of affecting the outcome is greater. In other words, 
it suggests a direct relationship between closeness and turnout. This notion comes from the rational choice 
approach to voting where the instrumental utility gained from voting is weighted by the probability to affect the 
outcome (Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). The inherent problem associated with this hypothesis is that 
the probability of affecting the outcome in a close election is null (Gelman et al., 1998; Mulligan and Hunter, 2003; 
Owen and Grofman, 1984), so people should not vote. However, an interesting approach is that this is true because 
people miscalculate their chances by being overly confident in their assessment. This conforms to the concept of 
“illusion of control” within social-psychology (Langer, 1975; Presson and Benassi, 1996).  
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raising efforts, borrowing and the use of politician’s personal financial resources. For example, 
financial contributors might be persuaded to give more either because their chances of affecting 
outcome is greater or because parties and candidates are willing to promise more favors in 
return (Cox and Munger, 1989; see also Denzau and Munger, 1986). This overall increasing of 
resources would be driven by the overall level of closeness in the election, i.e. the closeness of 
the national (election-level) race. Secondly, close elections might influence where and how the 
existing pool of resources are being allocated, i.e. how the mobilization efforts are focused 
(Bartels, 1985; Shaw, 1999, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: A multilevel interpretation of the mobilization hypothesis 
 
 
The allocation of resources should be driven by the relative degree of closeness in different 
areas, i.e. district-level closeness, because parties seek to allocate more resource in areas where 
the outcome is uncertain (and hence mobilization can be more decisive). Generally, then, one 
would therefore expect an overall increase in mobilization efforts in a closer election. Indeed, 
several studies of U.S. elections have found that campaign activity (Patterson and Caldeira, 
1983; Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999; Hill and McKee, 2005; Gimpel et al., 2007), campaign 
donations (Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr, 2000; Erikson and Palfrey, 2000), media coverage 
(Clarke and Evans, 1983; Jackson, 1996) and mobilization of elites (Cox and Munger, 1989) 
increases in a close election.  
 
The second assumption of this hypothesis is that mobilization affects turnout, an area of study 
that have received considerable scholarly attention. Increased mobilization efforts is expected 
to increase participation for several reasons (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Firstly, more 
information about the parties and the election becomes available, and people are more likely to 
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be (intentionally or unintentionally) exposed to the campaign, e.g. by increased media coverage 
or direct contacting by parties, which decrease the effort and time needed to attain information 
about the election or the parties. Secondly, this increase in exposure to the election is similarly 
likely to generate higher interest in the election in general. Thirdly, parties are likely to target 
their mobilization strategically, e.g. using existing networks (like unions and churches) or 
people centrally positioned in social networks (like business leaders or the wealthy and well 
educated). This, in turn, can increase the social pressure to vote. Although the research primarily 
focus on U.S.-elections, the link between mobilization and turnout have found wide support in 
the literature. Studies on the effect of campaign spending (Caldeira and Patterson, 1982; 
Caldeira et al., 1985; Cann and Cole, 2011; Cox and Munger, 1989; Grier and Munger, 1991, 
1993; Jackson, 1997, 2002; Patterson and Caldeira, 1983), direct contacting (Abramson and 
Claggett, 2001; Gerber and Green, 2000; Goldstein and Ridout, 2002; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 
1992; Kramer, 1970; McClurg, 2004; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Wielhouwer, 1999, 2003; 
Wielhouwer and Lockerbie, 1994), political advertising (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; 
Franz et al., 2008; Krasno and Green, 2008; Nagler and Leighley, 1992; Sigelman and Kugler, 
2003; Wattenberg and Brians, 1999) and “demobilization” campaigning (Berelson, 1954; 
Converse, 1962; Zipp, 1985) generally tend to find that increased mobilization efforts increase 
participation.  
 
 
2.6.1 Hypothesis 3: Mobilizing the interest of educated individuals 
Here I build on the resource model of participation. The resource model—also called the civic 
voluntarism model—centers on a socio-economic account of participating, where different 
types of resources determine the likelihood of participating in elections (Brady et al., 1995; Nie 
and Verba, 1987; Verba et al., 1995). As Brady et al. (1995: 271) famously argued, people don’t 
vote because they can’t, because they don’t want to, or because nobody asked. In other words, 
people need the right amount of resources, interest and mobilization in order to vote. High-
resource actors already have a high propensity for voting. However, even if people are rich in 
resources, they will not participate if they are not aware of the importance of their involvement 
or “no one asked” them to do so (Brady et al., 1995: 271).  
 
If we use the resource model and ask, “for whom does closeness count?” with the mobilization 
hypothesis in mind, the most intuitive answer is educated individuals. It counts because it fuels 
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their interest in the election. Education is important because it is considered a key indicator of 
both access to information and civic skills, and an ability for processing political information 
(Dalton, 2008; Brady et al., 1995). Following the mobilization argument above, we assume that 
politicians and parties target their mobilization (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Specifically, 
they strategically mobilize those that have the highest probability of providing benefit. 
Educated individuals are a key group because they are the most likely to respond to mobilization 
(Brady et al., 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). In addition, if we sum the indirect 
consequence of increased mobilization in a close election, it also includes increased exposure 
to the election via media coverage and social network effects. For example, informational 
contagion (Burt, 2000) and behavioral contagion (Kenny, 1992), where those already mobilized 
by a party or candidate influence those around them. Informational contagion is influence by 
those already mobilized by them increasing the level of politically-centered conversation and 
alter its content, while behavioral contagion is their influence by increasing their political 
involvement (McClurg, 2004). These factors should affect educated individuals more because 
of their larger recruitment network, increased civic skills and ability to process political 
information (Verba et al., 1995: 376; Brady et al., 1995). 
 
 
Figure 5: Hypothesis 3, closeness of elections affects the interest in the election for educated individuals 
without a habit of voting 
 
 
In addition, this should only matter for those without a habit of voting. Once the election comes, 
the response of voting is likely to be activated and other responses deactivated. This 
automaticity and response should hold for most aspects of the election. It is not that a habitual 
voter will or will not be interested in the election, but a closer election—despite the increase in 
mobilization and election coverage—should not change the already established pattern for most 
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people. I therefore hypothesize that the effect of closeness of election is moderated by both 
education and habit: 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 Closeness of election affects the interest in the election for people with 
higher education that does not have a habit of voting 
 
 
 
2.6.2 Hypothesis 4: Cueing partisan loyalty 
Closeness of election should also affect the interest in the election for people that feel close to 
particular party. Not because of direct or indirect mobilization per se, but because of the 
increased exposure to the election and media coverage it creates, close election triggers group-
based loyalty. Kam and Utych (2011: 1252) argues that “[c]lose elections may trigger group-
based loyalties and thus cognitively engage citizens because they want to “root for their team””. 
I reiterate the same argument. This also fits into the heuristic and systematic information-
processing model. Rather than processing the election information through accuracy-motivated 
heuristic or systematic processing, these voters may be driven by impression-motivated 
processing (Chen et al., 1996: 46; Chen et al., 1999; Kam and Utych, 2011). This type od 
information processing are focused more on determining what decisions and opinions will 
satisfy the current social goal. Also, for same reasons as in the last section, it should be 
conditional on the habit of voting. My hypothesis is therefore that closeness counts for those 
close to a party and without the habit of voting: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 4 Closeness of election affects the interest in the election for people that feel 
close to a political party and that do not have a habit of voting 
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Figure 6: Hypothesis 4, closeness of elections affects the interest in election for people that feel close to a 
party and does not have a habit of voting 
 
 
 
 
2.6.3 Hypothesis 5: Close elections and voting through interest 
Interest in the election should mediate the relationship between closeness of elections and 
voting. Of course, this relationship is more complicated underneath (as discussed above). 
However, closeness of election should affect both the level of interest in the election, and the 
propensity to vote for those that already are interested. I therefore also expect that—on 
average—closeness of election should affect the decision to vote indirectly through interest in 
the election.  
 
 
Hypothesis 5 Closeness of election affects voting through interest in the election 
 
Figure 7: Hypothesis 5, closeness of election affects voting indirectly through interest in the election 
 
 
 
 
 
Closeness of 
election 
Habit  
Interest in the 
election 
Party 
attachment 
Closeness of 
election 
Voting 
Interest in the 
election 
   
  32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because of the scope and comparative nature of the data applied in the analysis, a 
comprehensive overview of the data is important. This chapter presents an overview of the data 
and measurements used in the analysis. I first provide an overview of data and then introduce 
the variables. In section 3.3 I describe in more detail how I calculated closeness of election. 
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3.1 Overview of data 
 
The unit of analysis is voting-aged individuals. However, the aim of this study is to infer on 
how closeness of election affects the decision to vote comparatively across different types of 
political systems. In order to examine both supply- and demand-side factors simultaneously, I 
base the analysis on both micro- and macro-level data. I use data from Module 3 of the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), which is excellent for this purpose. The CSES 
is a collaborative project that provides post-election survey data in addition to relevant 
contextual data about the elections and the political system. This includes the district-level data 
necessary to calculate the margin of victory. CSES Module 3 tracked elections in 41 countries 
between 2006 and 2011, and subsequently includes data from 50 elections. After removing 
missing data—including districts without enough election-data to calculate the margin of 
victory)—I am left with 35,913 (eligible) respondents in 1444 district-elections in 26 countries. 
This covers a total of 31 elections. I restrict the analysis the legislative (lower house) elections. 
I provide a descriptive overview in Table 2. The sample of countries spans several types of 
electoral- and party-systems. The CSES is a unique resource for the comparative study of 
electoral behavior in this way, because of the wide scope and inclusion of both micro- and 
macro-level data. However, it have been criticized for not having standardized rules on 
translation and not insisting on random sampling (Curtice, 2007: 902).  
 
My measure of closeness of election is a combination of both district- and national-level 
margin. Hence, it varies by district. Because I for some countries have more than one election 
(Mexico, Finland, Iceland, Norway and the Netherlands), the second level in the multilevel 
models are district-election. Meaning that for these countries, some districts are parted in two 
clusters (because there are data from two separate elections for the same district). A sufficient 
number of clusters are necessary for the estimation of the variance component of multilevel 
models to be accurate, especially when several levels are included. Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 
(2008: 62) recommends the use of at least 10 to 20 clusters for a multilevel random effects 
model. The multilevel regression models used in this analysis includes 1444 districts-elections 
at the second level within 26 countries at the third level, which should meet this requirement. 
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Table 2: Overview of the elections included in the analysis 
Overview of the elections included in the analysis 
Electoral System Country Year of 
election 
N of 
Resp./ 
Districts 
Median/SD 
of Margin of 
victory 
National- 
level 
Margin 
National-
level 
Turnout 
Type Allocation Method 
M
aj
o
ri
ta
ri
an
 a
n
d
 
m
ix
ed
 s
y
st
em
s 
P
lu
ra
li
ty
 
Single 
Majority 
Districts 
Canada 2008 1251/209 15.9/7.89 11.39 58.8 
Germany 2009 1,836/208 16.75/4.09 25.4 70.78 
Japan 2007 945/35 7.35/4.19 7.8 58.64 
Mexico 2006 1,420/83 5.96/5.81 .58 63.67 
2009 2,255/122 14.31/4.97 18.8 44.8 
New Zealand 2008 914/70 16.35/6.67 13.82 79.46 
United States 2008 1,364/94 15.7/10.87 10.6 74.4 
M
aj
o
ri
ty
 Run-off France 2007 1,838/187 10.83/5.47 10.02 64.42 
Alt. Vote Australiaa 2007 1,164/147 10.31/4.47 5.4 94.76 
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 R
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
H
ig
h
es
t 
Q
u
o
ti
en
t 
D’Hondt 
Chile 2009 26/2 1.48/.06 .90 87.67 
Croatia 2007 533/6 1.26/1.15 2.2 63.41 
Czech Rep. 2006 1,680/14 2.38/1.45 3.89 64.42 
Denmark 2007 1,216/10 0.76/2.6 1 81.77 
Finland 2007 564/7 10.00/1.02 18.8 65.02 
2011 1,244/14 1.98/0.45 3.3 67.4 
Iceland 2007 1,377/6 18.82/1.77 32 83.62 
2009 1,226/6 3.1/1.10 3.72 85.12 
Poland 2007 1,337/36 5.46/1.47 9.4 53.88 
Slovakia 2010 1,125/1 4.72/0 9.41 58.97 
Turkeya 2011 581/40 15.13/4.33 23.85 83.16 
Modified 
Sainte-Laguë 
Latvia 2010 544/5 5.08/.64 9.74 63.12 
Norway 2005 1,844/18 1.06/0.76 1.1 77.78 
2009 1,701/19 2.65/2.22 3.1 76.4 
Sweden 2006 1,037/28 1.48/1.97 2.2 81.99 
L
ar
g
es
t 
R
em
ai
n
d
er
 
Droop Quota Slovenia 2008 838/8 1.47/2.07 1.19 63.1 
Hare Quota 
Brazila 2010 187/5 15.05/0.06 30.10 82 
Estonia 2011 621/9 3.38/2.53 1.9 70.92 
Greece 2009 916/52 3.79/1.78 4.81 70.92 
Hong Kong 2008 105/1 14.37/0 23.34 45.2 
Netherlands 2006 2,153/1 1.22/0 2.44 80.35 
2010 1,971/1 0.43/0 .86 75.4 
a. Compulsory voting (enforced) 
Source: Module 3 of The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
Note: All data are for elections to the lower house of the legislator. The “margin of victory” is the combined 
measure (see 3.3). 
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3.2 Dependent variable: Voting 
 
The main dependent variable for this thesis is whether the respondent cast a ballot. The variable 
is coded as binary variable with 1 representing that the respondent did cast a ballot and 0 
representing that the respondent did not. It is constructed from item Q21 of the CSES survey 
module (CSES Module 3). They do not have any standardized wording, so the phrasing of the 
question vary from country to country. Of the 35,913 respondents included in main analysis, 
4,447 reported that they did vote (12.4 percent).  
 
 
 
Figure 8: Actual vs. self-reported turnout for the data used in the analyses 
 
 
 
Because it is only based on a survey question it is self-reported—rather than actual—turnout. 
Using self-reported turnout is not without caveat. There are notable problems related to using 
self-reported voting because of non-response bias (none-voters are less likely to respond to a 
questionnaire) and misreporting (respondents claiming to vote when they didn’t) (Fieldhouse 
et al., 2007: 801). Karp and Brockington (2005: 825) estimate that, during the 1990s, the gap 
between self-reported turnout and official turnout in the American National Election Studies 
(ANES) was over 20 percentage points. Using self-reported turnout can therefore quickly lead 
to validity problems. While most studies of over-reporting focus on individual-level problems 
of social desirability bias (e.g. Bernstein et al., 2001; Silver et al., 1986; Granberg and 
   
  36 
Holmberg, 1991; Holbrook and Krosnick, 2012), recent studies have emphasized contextual 
factors (Górecki, 2011; Karp and Brockington, 2005). More specifically, elections that are high-
salience may generate higher over-reporting rates (Górecki, 2011: 544). This might be a 
particular problem for this analysis because the institutional setting that facilitates a high-
salience (or “high-stake”) election  is the primary focus of the analysis (see Franklin, 2004: 44).  
I plot the aggregated self-reported turnout against actual turnout rates in Figure 8 for the data 
used in the analysis. Each dot represents a country and the black line is a regression line. There 
is very little deviation from the trend (R2=.69; std. error=7.2; p<.001). The intercept, however, 
is at 24.1. In other words, although the relationship between self-reported and actual turnout 
rates are stable across the sample, it is stable at about 20 percentage points above actual turnout 
rate. This is about the “usual” rate of turnout misreporting in such surveys. It does emphasize 
the inherit problem with analyzing voter turnout at the individual-level, albeit there is little to 
do to correct it. An alternative to survey data is validated voting data, but they are very hard to 
come by and never includes as much information. The problem of over-reporting bias is a 
chronic feature of the individual-level turnout research from which I can do nothing to exempt 
from. 
 
 
3.2.1 Information seeking (as a measure of interest in the election) 
In order to measure the degree of interest in the election I use information seeking. Although 
interest can take many forms, the amount information the respondent sought should be a perfect 
measure. This is because it measures how much actual attention was given to campaign, and at 
the same time, it separates between the general notion of interest in politics and the specific 
interest in the election.  I created the information seeking variable from a CSES survey question 
phrased the following way: “How closely did you follow the election campaign? Very closely, 
fairly closely, not very closely, or not closely at all?”. It is therefore a four-valued scale from 
one to four. About 9 percent reported they followed the campaign “not closely at all”, 34 percent 
“not very closely”, 42 percent “fairly closely” and 15 percent “very closely”. Some consider it 
problematic to use measure of interest in the election  
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3.3 Calculating the closeness of an election as the margin of victory 
 
I use post-election data in order to calculate closeness of election. It is comprised of the 
percentage point vote share margin of victory at both the district- and national level. The 
measure of closeness I use for the regression analyses is thus a combined measure: The 
closeness of an election is the mean of the national- and district-level margins. Because it varies 
by district it is a district-level variable. For the regression analyses, I reversed the scale so that 
a higher number means it is a closer election. In general terms, I refer to the theoretical 
concept—i.e. the uncertainty of an election—as “closeness of election”, and the measure I use 
for this as the “margin of victory”.  My combined measure can in theory range from near zero 
(most close) to one hundred (least close). The least close election in my sample is fifty. Hence, 
the scale ranges from (near) zero to fifty. I have plotted the distribution density for the scale in 
Figure 9. In the regression analysis—where the measure is reversed—the closest elections (with 
a margin near zero) is about fifty.   
 
 
 
Figure 9: Histogram (density plot) of the combined margin of victory 
 
 
 
 
 
0
 
.0
2
 
.0
4
 
.0
6
 
D
en
si
ty
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 
Margin of Victory 
   
  38 
3.3.1 National-level margin of victory 
Although sophisticated measures of district-level closeness have been introduced in the 
literature over the recent years, there is no standard of cross-national measure of closeness at 
the national-level. The national-level margin is measured simply as the margin between the 
winning and losing bloc, similarly to van Egmond (2003). That it is, the number of votes cast 
for the winning “bloc” minus the number cast for the loosing “bloc”. What defines each bloc 
where a qualitative judgment. For elections with electoral alliances, I used the margin between 
the winning and losing alliance. Where a single party won the majority (e.g. the US), the margin 
is between the winning party and the runner up. I used official election data for each estimates. 
I present all the margins I estimated in Table 2 for scrutiny.  
 
3.3.2 District-level margin of victory 
As noted, I use the margin between the winner and the runner up for the marginal seat to 
measure the district-level margin victory. CSES only provides contextual data for the primary 
electoral district (i.e. the lowest tier), however. I have only calculated the district-level margin 
at this tier. Many countries allocates seats at several tiers. Germany, for example, allocates 
different seats at the district- and regional-level using (very) different formulas. In addition, the 
CSES only provides data for up to nine parties per district. Districts with more than nine parties 
have incomplete data. I have discarded districts where information on more than ten percent of 
vote share is missing. Otherwise, I summed the missing vote share into one “party” for the 
computation of the district margin. Another thing to note is that these methods operates with 
the number of votes when allocating seats. CSES only provide data for the vote share (percent) 
each party received. The principal computation remains the same, however, but with the end 
result being the vote share margin as opposed to the actual vote margin.   
 
For plurality single-majority the race for marginal seat is simply between the two largest parties. 
Hence, the district-level margin of victory is calculated as the (percentage point) margin 
between the party with most votes and the party with the second most votes, based on the CSES 
data. Note that both France and Australia have majority systems where candidates need an 
absolute majority in order to win a seat. France have run-off elections if no candidates gets 
enough votes. Australia uses an alternative vote system where the candidate with the least 
amount of votes get removed—and its votes distributed on the remaining candidates based its 
voters preferences—until one party have an absolute majority. CSES only provides data from 
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the first round in both these cases. The district-level margin in France and Australia is therefore 
also the (percentage point) margin between the two parties with the most votes.  
 
However, for systems using proportional representation the calculation is bit more complicated. 
I provide two hypothetical examples below to better illustrate. Table 3 shows the allocation of 
seats based on the Hare quota (largest remainder) and Table 4 the same using D’Hondt (highest 
fraction) for a hypothetical district with three parties competing over five seats (the same as 
Selb, 2009). I first go through the Hare quota example to illustrate how I computed the margin 
in largest remainder systems, and then the D’Hondt example to illustrate how I computed the 
margin in systems using highest fraction. For an overview of electoral systems and formulas, 
see e.g. Lijphart and Grofman (1984), Gallagher (1992, 1991)  and Farrell and McAllister 
(2003).  
 
Methods using largest remainder first divide the vote shares for each party by a quota. The two 
quotas used by countries in the analyses are the Hare and Droop quota. The Hare quota is given 
by taking 
total votes
total seats
 , and the Droop quota by the integer of 
total votes
1
1  total seats


. The integer 
left after dividing (i.e. how many times each party can fill the quota) is the number of seats 
allocated automatically to each party. The ranking of the fractional remainders determine the 
allocation of the remaining seats, which are allocated one by one until all seats are filled. In the 
hypothetical example with five seats (Table 3), the Hare quota becomes 20 (100/5). After 
dividing the vote share of each party by the quota, we see that party A gets two automatic seats 
(with an integer of 2) and party B one (with an integer of 1). Party C did not make the quota 
(with only a fraction .85). Three (of the total five) seats have then been allocated automatically, 
so there are two seats left to be allocated by the highest fractional remainder. The first of the 
two remaining seats are giving to party C (with a fractional remainder of .85) and the second to 
party A (.65).  The marginal seat is the last seat allocated of the remaining seats. In this case, 
the race for the marginal seat is fought between party A (.65) and party B (.5). The district-level 
margin is then calculated as 20 (.65 .5) 3   , where 20 is the devisor that produced the fraction 
(i.e. the quota). In other words, party B would need another proportion of 3 of the vote to win 
the final seat. 
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Table 3: Distribution of seats using the Hare quote in a hypothetical  
district with five seats and three competing parties 
Party A B C Total 
Vote share 53 30 17 100 
Total seats:    5 
Quota    20 
Votes/Quota 2.65 1.5 .85  
Automatic seats 2 1 0 3 
Remainder .65 .5 .85  
Highest remainder seats 1 0 1 2 
Total seats 3 1 1 5 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Distribution of seats using the D'Hondt in a hypothetical  
district with five seats and three competing parties 
Divisor Party A Party B Party C 
1 53 (1) 30 (2) 17 (5) 
2 27 (3) 15  8 
3 18 (4)   
4 13   
Total 
seats: 
3 1 1 
 
 
 
 
The other type of proportional allocation method used by countries in the sample is the highest 
average methods. This method divides the vote share of each party by a series of devisors and 
allocate seats one by one to the party with the highest fraction. D’Hondt formula uses 1,2,3… 
as divisors and Modified Sainte-Laguë uses 1.4,3,5… The hypothetical example in Table 4 
shows the allocation of seats according to the D’Hondt formula. The hypothetical district—
including vote share—is the same as in the Hare quota example above. We see that D’Hondt 
would allocate party A the first seat (53), party B the second (30), party A the third (27) and 
fourth (18) and party C the fifth (17). The marginal seat is the last allocated seat. Party B have 
the highest fraction (at 15) after the other seats have been allocated, and is therefore the 
contender for this seat. In this example, I would calculate the district-level margin as 
2 (17 15) 4   . In other words, the increase in the proportion of votes that party B needs in 
order to secure the marginal seat is 4. If we compare the two example, we see that both formula 
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allocates the same amount of seats for the different parties. However, who competes for the 
marginal seat is different. Under the Hare quota it is party A and B that competes for marginal 
seat with a margin of 3, while under D’Hondt it is C and B with a margin of 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Comparison of a combined versus district- and national-level measures of closeness 
Dark dots represent systems with compulsory voting. 
 
 
 
There are a few notable exceptions, however. Brazil uses the Hare quota but allocates the 
remaining seats using the D’Hondt formula. I calculated the margin of victory in Brazil using 
the competition for the marginal seat allocated at the D’Hondt stage. Greece also allocates 
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remaining seats in a non-standard way. Greece allocates the remaining seats in two stages using 
both national- and district-level vote count in a rather complex system. The CSES does not 
provide enough data to calculate this correctly. I therefore calculated the district-level margin 
in Greece as in a “normal” largest-remainder system. Furthermore, Ireland have a peculiar 
(proportional) single-transferable-voting system where the remaining seats are allocated by 
transferring the surplus votes of the candidates that have already made the quota  (see Bowler 
and Grofman, 2000). Because CSES only provides data for the voters first preference—and 
since the formula works similarly to normal largest-remainder methods in practice—the 
district-level margin in Ireland is calculated the same way as a “normal” Hare-quota country.  
 
 
3.3.3 The combined measure 
As noted, I argue that both national- and district-level margins should be combined in order to 
measure the uncertainty of an election. I combined the computed district-level margin with my 
estimated national-level margin so that the margin of election k for individual i living in district 
j is 
,
2
j k
ijk
MARGIN MARGIN
MARGIN

 . 
For the analysis, the measure is simply reversed as  
 (max[ ] min[ ])ijk ijkCLOSENESS MARGIN MARGIN MARGIN    , 
so that a higher number equals a closer election. I have plotted the combined compared to the 
district- and national-level measures in Figure 10. Black dots represents districts with 
compulsory voting. Note that this is the actual margin, so dots near zero on the x-axis are 
district-election that were dead heat. It can be somewhat misleading, because the amount of 
districts varies from country to country. The Netherlands, for example, is one big district. 
However, the first notable thing is that districts with compulsory voting clearly separates from 
the rest, and show no structural pattern with regard to the margin of victory. The second 
noticeable thing is that the combined measure show how the variation in closeness of election 
actually is much larger once we account for both margins. 
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Figure 11: Comparison of closeness of election for different electoral systems and formulas 
 
 
 
This is especially noticeable for systems with proportional representation. I have plotted the 
district- and combined measure by electoral system in Figure 11, and color-coded the different 
formulas.  For majoritarian systems, the increase in variation is not that dramatic, although the 
tight clustering in the upper left corner is more spread out. There is however a clear separation 
between systems with compulsory voting and the rest: The line of dots at the top—with a clear 
margin between them and the rest—is the district-elections in Australia. For PR systems, 
however, we see that combining national- and district-level closeness changes the picture 
completely. While the district-level margins are all clustered tight around the zero, when 
including the national-level margin a clear linear pattern between turnout and closeness appears. 
Note that most of the dots breaking of that structure are districts in Turkey and Brazil, which 
have compulsory voting. This emphasize the point that the national-level margin is especially 
important in PR systems.  
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3.4 Individual-level variables 
My main focus independent variable—aside from information seeking and closeness of 
election—is electoral experience, which I use to measure the degree of habit. In the analysis, I 
also control for the individual-level variables education, party attachment, political efficacy, 
age and gender. I present them here in turn. 
 
3.4.1 Electoral experience (as a measure of habit) 
I measure electoral experience as the amount of elections the respondent have experienced if 
they voted in the last election based on the respondents age. Hence, electoral experience is 
coded 0 if they reported that they did not vote in the last election. The measure goes from 0 to 
22. About 18 percent are coded 0, with rest being distributed rather like a (slightly left-skewed) 
normal distribution between 1 to 22. A key thing I am interested in is habit. As discussed in the 
theory section, building on the developmental model participation and cognitive psychology, I 
expect habit to work as “buffer” for decision to vote. In other words, the key condition for any 
mechanism to make any difference for the actual act of voting for an individual, is that they do 
not do not “already” vote because they simply have a habit of doing so. However, to measure 
habit directly is probably impossible. In order to capture this concept as accurately as possible 
I use a measure of electoral experience. As argued in the theory section, although some assume 
not voting to also be habit forming (e.g., Górecki, 2011), this is of course not the case (see e.g. 
Aldrich et al., 2011). In addition, it should typically take at least three elections before someone 
vote as habit (Plutzer, 2002). So if someone have an electoral experience of less than three, we 
can reasonably assume they did not vote (if they did) as an act of habit. Likewise, if someone 
reported they voted in the last election and have lived through more than twenty, it is very 
probable it was a habit. Hence, I try to measure the “degree of habit” by assuming that the 
higher the electoral experience, the more likely someone is to have a habit of voting.  
 
3.4.2 Higher education 
Education is of course a key variable accounting for the degree of resources (Brady et al., 1995; 
see also e.g., Gallego, 2010). Higher education is a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent 
attended (finished or not) education at the university level, and 0 otherwise. It is based from 
item D3 which ranges from 1 (no education) to 8 (finished university degree). Although the 
original variable contains more information in this regard, because I do not consider the 
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difference between the levels of the scale to be equal enough I recoded it into a more sensible 
dummy. 
 
3.4.3 Attachment to party 
The variable for party attachment is comprised from item Q20C, “Do you feel very close to this 
party, somewhat close or not very close?”, where respondent answered either “not very close”, 
“somewhat close” and “very close”. I have coded “not very close” as 1 and “very close” as 3. 
Because it includes a lot of missing variables, I filled in values from item Q20A, “Do you feel 
close to one party?”. This item only have two responses (yes or no), so I coded those who 
answered “no” as “not very close”, and those who answered “yes” as “somewhat close”. Fitting 
the models only using Q20C (N ~ 18,000)—that is, without combining the two measures—
produces the same results, including quantities of interest, as those presented here. 
 
3.4.4 Political efficacy 
Political efficacy was created by combining Q4, “Who is in power can make a big difference?” 
and Q5, “Who people vote for makes a big difference”. These questions measure how much 
influence respondents think they have on the political system. The two items are combined to 
one variable ranging from 2 to 10. I use this variable as a proxy for measuring the degree to 
which the respondents think their vote will make a difference. It measure this indirectly. While 
the term “efficacy” within psychology usually refers to the ability of bringing about change 
directly by one’s self (see e.g. Bandura, 1977), this variable measures to what degree the 
respondents think they’re vote will affect the political system. That is, if the individual act of 
voting makes a difference on the results and if the results makes a difference for the political 
system. The findings for political efficacy at the individual-level is somewhat mixed, however. 
Smets and Ham (2013) finds that most test (they include) do find a significant and positive 
effect of efficacy on turnout, but also that most studies do not. I include this variable because 
of the decision hypothesis. I want to control for what would be a second (also interesting) 
alternative mechanisms: If close elections make more people feel their vote matters and are 
more inclined to vote because of it.  
 
3.4.5 Age, age squared and gender 
The resource model of political participation consistently link variables like age and education 
to higher turnout (Brady et al., 1995). Being older increase information and lower the cost of 
seeking information because it increases access to resources (Moyser and Day, 1992). Although 
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the variable for electoral experience may be very correlated with age, age is an important 
predictor also for other reasons. I include age and age squared as control variables to cover 
other non-habit related factors. In other words, with the risk of confounding, I wish to separate 
the effect of electoral experience from other age-related turnout-boosting factors. In addition, I 
included a demographic control variable for gender as female coded 1 if the respondent was 
female.  
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3.5 District- and national-level control variables 
 
I also include variables for district magnitude, compulsory voting, Proportional representation 
and Freedom House rating. District magnitude (along with closeness of election) is at the 
district, i.e. second, level. Compulsory voting, proportional representation and Freedom House 
rating is at country, i.e. third, level. I present them here in turn. 
 
3.5.1 District magnitude (district-level) 
The district magnitude is the amount of seats in each district, i.e. a district-level variable. It 
varies from 42 to 1, with the exception of the Netherlands which have a district magnitude of 
150. Blais and Lago (2009: 98) argues that the impact of closeness of election decreases as the 
district magnitude increases. However, in the way I measure closeness, I remain somewhat 
skeptical: Although there are more seats contest, the crucial thing determining the closeness of 
an election is the marginal (pivotal) seat. Even if a district have a very large number of seats, it 
can still be pivotal if the last seat is closely contested. I include it as a control because the 
closeness measure I use is the vote share margin, and not the actual vote margin. It is possible 
to imagine that the one seats in a SMD election has a higher value than one of the 150 of the 
Netherlands.  
 
 
3.5.2 Compulsory voting (country-level) 
In include three country-level variables. Firstly, I include a dummy variable for compulsory 
voting, coded 1 if there is enforced compulsory voting and 0 otherwise. Both Australia Turkey 
and Brazil have compulsory voting in my sample. The positive effect of compulsory voting on 
turnout is among the most robust findings in the literature (see Geys, 2006: for a review; see 
also e.g. Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Hadjar and Beck, 2010; Jackman and Miller, 1995). As 
indicated by the graphical representation of the margin in section 3.2.1, countries with 
compulsory voting have an equally high turnout out rate regardless of the closeness of the 
election.  
 
 
3.5.3 Proportional representation (country-level) 
In addition, I include a dummy variable for proportional representation, coded 1 if the electoral 
system is proportional and 0 if it is majoritarian or mixed. 18 of the 26 countries in the analyses 
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have PR (see Table 2). Turnout tend to be much higher in proportional electoral systems (Blais 
and Dobrzynska, 1998; Franklin, 2002; Jackman, 1987; Jackman and Miller, 1995; Selb, 2009). 
Because the nature of the competition is so different, this is of course a key control variable.  
 
 
3.5.4 Freedom House (country-level) 
I also include a variable for the Freedom House rating of the respective country. The FH rating 
is a measure of the degree of freedoms and civil liberties.  The ranking goes from 1 to 17, with 
countries below 3 are considered free, and countries between 3 and 5 are considered “partly 
free”. Most countries in my analysis have a rating of one. However, Turkey and Hong Kong 
have a rating of 3 and 3.5, making them only “partly free”. Eight countries in the sample have 
a rating above 1 but below 3. Although the Freedom House score is often criticized (e.g., 
Erdmann and Kneuer, 2011: 105), different levels of civil liberties can make for different 
dynamics with regard to how closeness affects turnout. This is key because I do wish a 
comparable sample, albeit with a big scope in order to infer more generally. 
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter described the data, measurement and operationalization used in the analysis. The 
data set includes 35,913 respondents as unit of analysis, nested within 1444 district-election 
again nested in 26 countries. The data is therefore structured in three hierarchical levels, with 
district-elections as second and country as third. It is “district-election” because the same 
district in two elections in the same country are considered separate clusters (to ease 
computation). The data is comprised from the CSES and covers 31 elections between 2006 and 
2011. In order to measure closeness of election I computed the vote share margin between the 
winner and looser of the marginal seat, and combined that with the national-level two-bloc 
margin. 
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4. METHOD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following chapter deals with the methods and methodologies that are used in the analysis. 
I take a quantitative approach and use multilevel regression models—both linear and logistic—
as well as average causal mediation analysis. In general, I adopt a comparative perspective 
within this framework. I begin the chapter by introducing the general research design. I then 
discuss the multilevel models. Lastly, I explain the estimation procedure of the average causal 
mediation analysis.  
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4.1 Research design 
 
The implicit aim of this thesis is to make some inferences about the complex relationship 
between closeness of election, several moderating factors, and the decision to vote. I regard it 
as comparative because, as Przeworski and Teune (1970: 74) argues, comparative politics deals 
with “the influence of larger systems upon the characteristics of units within them”. To be able 
to deal with the large amount of individual-level data and at the same time make as accurate 
inferences as possible—and keeping within the tradition of the turnout literature—I use 
quantitative methods. Because my unit of analysis are individuals at the micro-level and my 
focus independent variable is at the macro-level, my theory implies a relationship between 
several layers of data (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). More accurately, my data have three 
levels, with (i) individuals nested within (ii) district-elections, which in turn are nested within 
(iii) countries. For hypotheses 1 and 2 I use multilevel logistic regression models with voting 
(i.e. did or did not vote) as dependent variable. For hypotheses 3 and 4 I use multilevel linear 
models with information seeking as dependent variable. In order to test the conditional effects 
I use interaction terms and calculate marginal effects. For hypothesis testing, I primarily rely 
on this rather than the main effects. Lastly, for hypothesis 5 I use both and estimate the average 
causal mediation effect. 
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4.2 Multilevel regression models 
 
All regression models included in the analysis are multilevel models. Both linear and logistic 
regression models rest on the assumption that there is no autocorrelation, i.e. that the 
observations are independent from one another (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008: 323). This 
is not the case here, because my data have a natural multilevel structure. We can reasonably 
assume that individuals within the same districts and individuals within the same countries are 
more similar to one another compared to individuals in other districts and countries. If such 
inter-individual dependencies are not accounted for, the standard errors are usually 
underestimated and effects seems more statistically significant than they actually are (Hox, 
2010: 6). Multilevel analysis is a statistical technique that allows for the analysis of independent 
variables operating at different levels, i.e. where the units of analysis are hierarchically nested 
within groups (Hox, 2010), as here. The fundamental idea of multilevel regression modeling is 
to account for a hierarchically structured data by implementing random effects at the various 
hierarchical levels. For the first model—where I test hypothesis 1 and 2—I use a logistic 
regression model. This is because the dependent variable is binary (did vote /did not vote). In 
the second model—where I test hypothesis 3 and 4—I use a linear regression model. More 
accurately, I use linear mixed models and generalized linear mixed models. In this chapter I 
focus on the estimation procedure, modeling choices, assumptions and interpretation of the 
models. An in-depth statistical account of multilevel regression models are available by e.g., 
Bryk and Raudenbush (1992), Goldstein (2011), Snijder and Bosker (2004) and Hox (2010). 
 
4.2.1 Model estimation 
When using multilevel models, it is generally recommended to start with an empty model (only 
including the random intercept for the dependent variable) and build stepwise up to the finished 
model with all variables and interaction terms (Luke, 2004). This is called the “bottom-up” 
approach (Hox, 2010). The idea is to continuously watch the standard errors and residual 
variance at the distinct levels while gradually adding variables. The alternative is to start with 
all variables and gradually strip down (Hox, 2010: 56). However, the bottom-up approach is 
usually considered more parsimonious (Luke, 2004). In my estimation procedure, I used the 
bottom-up approach for both the linear models and the logistic models: First, I estimated an 
empty model only including the dependent variable and the random intercept at the district-
election- and country-level. Second, I included the individual-level variables. Third, I added 
the district-level level variables, which includes closeness of election. Fourth, I added the 
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country-level control variables. These four models then serve as a reference point. Fifth, I added 
the interaction terms, with one model for each hypothesis. I evaluate the goodness-of-fit for 
each model using information criteria and looking at the variance at the higher levels. All 
models in the analysis include the same 35,913 respondents, nested in 144 district-election and 
26 countries. Because I have the same data for all models they easier to compare (Hox, 2010: 
49).  
 
All models are fixed slope random intercept models, i.e. I only let the intercepts vary between 
district-elections and countries. An alternative approach would be to let the slope of closeness 
of election to vary between countries as well, but I have not done so here. The estimation is 
done using maximum likelihood (ML). ML uses the mean and variance as parameters and 
estimates the values with the highest likelihood of generating the observed sample, given that 
the assumptions of the model are true (Hox, 2010). For the logistic regression models, the log-
likelihood is approximated using adaptive Gauss-Hermite with 25 quadrature (integration) 
points. All “main” models are estimated in Stata 13.1 using the mixed command for the linear 
multilevel models and the meqrlogit command for the logistic multilevel models. The 
regression models estimated for the average causal mediation analysis—that are modelled to 
“mimic” the main models—are estimated using the lme4 package in R. The control parameters 
for these models are set so that they are as equivalent as possible to the models estimated in 
Stata. 
 
4.2.2 Information criterion and model comparison 
To evaluate the model performance I use Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1998), 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978) and the deviance (-2*log-likelihood). 
For each measure, a lower value should constitute a better fit. Often, evaluating regression 
models include evaluating R2-values. However, especially for multilevel models, the R2 is not 
considered very useful, because it cannot be interpreted as the proportion of explained variance 
as is done in a standard linear regression (Luke, 2004). Instead, you would get an R2 value for 
each of the three levels which, although possible (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008: 103), is 
not done here. In pretext of a multilevel model, information criterions like the AIC and BIC as 
relativistic measures are more useful. The deviance is not an information criterion per say, it 
measures the goodness-of-fit only by looking at the log-likelihood (LL). Neither deviance, AIC 
or BIC are particularly useful by themselves (see e.g., Trivedi, 2010: 359). However, because I 
will estimate several models, they are used to compare each model relative to each other. The 
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deviance statistic will generally decrease as the parameter of the model increases (i.e. with the 
complexity of the model). This will make it automatically favor the more complex models, 
making it less useful when comparing the models including interaction terms with those that 
don’t, for example. For this reason  
 
I also include AIC and BIC. They are also based in the LL, but includes penalties when adding 
more variables. The AIC penalize based on number of variables in model and the BIC also 
penalize based on the sample size. I have estimated both AIC, BIC and deviance for each model. 
I will also report the intra-class correlation (ICC). I calculate the ICC by dividing the residual 
variance in the dependent variable at the higher levels by its total variance. It can be interpreted 
as the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that happens between—rather than 
within—the different levels. In logistic models the residual variance at the first level is fixed at 
3.29, so the ICC is primarily affected by changes in the variance term at the higher levels (Hox, 
2010: 59). Because of the large sample size (with N almost 36,000) the probability of getting 
statistically significant results is higher, so the α-value is set to five percent. However, the actual 
threshold is often somewhat arbitrary (as in .049 vs. .051). I do not reject the null hypotheses 
unless the threshold is met, but I still provide full p-values for the discussion. All significant 
tests are two-tailed.  
 
4.2.3 Interaction terms, conditional hypotheses and marginal effects 
All hypotheses, with the exception of hypothesis 5, are conditional hypotheses. That is, they 
mean to describe the relationship between closeness of election and voting, or closeness of 
election and engagement, where the effect is hypothesized to be contingent on a third and fourth 
variable (Franzese and Kam, 2009). The way to analysis this in a regression model is to include 
an interaction term between conditional variables (Brambor et al., 2006: 64).  In the case of 
logistic regression, however, some methodologists debate whether it is necessary to include the 
product term (Berry and Berry, 1991; Berry et al., 2010; Nagler, 1991; see also Rainey, 2014). 
This is based on the work of Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) who argued that registration 
requirements have a smaller effect on individuals with more education (Rainey, 2014: 2). They 
do not include any product term in the model when testing this by arguing that the logistic 
model accounts for this naturally because the S-shaped response curve creates a “compression 
effect” (Rainey, 2014: 2). However, Rainey (2014), using simulations, shows that excluding 
the product term bias the researcher towards finding an interaction. Therefore I also include 
interaction terms to test my conditional hypotheses for the logistic models. My hypotheses 
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primarily deals with the conditional relationship between three variables, meaning that I include 
an interaction between all three. In addition, it is important to include all constitutive variables, 
including all underlying two-way interaction (in the case of three-way interaction 
terms)(Brambor et al., 2006). When the interaction terms are included in the model, the main 
effect of the constitutive variables is not really interpretable as unconditional effects (Franzese 
and Kam, 2009: 20). The coefficients of the constitutive variables is the slope for one unit 
change in the dependent variable when the other variables included in the interaction term are 
zero. In other words, when including an interaction term, the coefficient of its constitutive terms 
have no meaningful theoretical value. When I test the unconditional relationship between these 
variables, it is by running a model without the interaction term. Some would argue, however, 
that if any variable is also part of an interaction effect, it makes little sense to analyze its 
unconditional effect (Brambor et al., 2006: 73). Although I would argue that this is not 
necessarily the case, my theoretical focus is more or less exclusively the conditional 
relationships. To analyze this in a meaningful way, I calculate the marginal effect of closeness 
of election across the different values of the variables I suspect it is dependent on. Only looking 
at the main effect of the interaction term make little sense because the it does not show the 
conditional uncertainties they are calculated on (Brambor et al., 2006). I present the marginal 
effects with confidence intervals graphically by plotting them for each interaction term.  
 
4.2.4 Hypotheses 1 and 2: Logistic regression 
The dependent variable for hypotheses 1 and 2 is a binary indicator of whether the respondent 
voted or not. Because it is a simple yes/no outcome it has two natural bounds and only two 
values, so a coefficient calculated using linear regression would be nonsensical, e.g. predicting 
negative values. In addition, having a binary dependent variable in a simple linear regression 
will violate several assumptions. Firstly, the residual variance would not be constant across the 
different values of the independent variables, i.e. the assumption of homoscedasticity would be 
violated (Menard, 2002: 7).  Second, the residuals would not be normally distributed. I therefore 
use a generalized linear model instead, which can treat the dependent variable as the outcome 
of a Bernoulli trail rather than as a continuous outcome. The regression is simply done with the 
natural logarithm of the odds of someone voting (i.e. logit) as the dependent variable instead, 
hence “logistic regression”. The results from the logistic regression models are presented as 
OR. For a continuous independent variable, the OR is the mean increase in odds of voting for 
a unit increase in that variable. For a dummy variable, the OR is the mean increase in odds of 
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voting if the dummy equals 1. An OR less than 1 means the odds is lower, and an OR higher 
than 1 mean that the odds is higher. 
 
To test hypothesis 1 I include an interaction term between electoral experience and closeness 
of election. Because I expect closeness of election to only have any effect for those without 
habit, I predict that the marginal effect of closeness should increase as electoral experience 
decreases. I fo this in two stages, however. My first model with this interaction term (2.4) does 
not include the motivational factors (information seeking, party attachment and efficacy). The 
second (2.5) does. Because I expect closeness of election to primarily affect voting indirectly 
through these variables, including them should reduce the statistically significant effect of 
closeness. My rationale for this expectation is that those variables are better predictor by 
themselves, and the regression model should not be able to see the difference between, e.g., 
those who are very interested in the election and those who got very interest in the election 
because the race was close. To test hypothesis 2 I include a three-way interaction term between 
closeness of election, electoral experience and information seeking. Because closeness of 
election should have an impact on those who are interested in the election and does not have a 
habit of voting, I predict that the marginal effect of closeness should be higher for this group. 
Conversely, that it should not be statistically significant those without any interest in the 
election and with very little electoral experience.  
 
4.2.5 Hypotheses 3 and 4: Linear regression 
For hypotheses 3 and 4 my dependent variable is the level of interest in election, measure by 
information seeking. To test hypothesis 3 I include a three-way interaction term between 
closeness of election, electoral experience and higher education. Because a closer election 
should fuel more interest in educated individuals without a habit of voting, I predict that 
closeness of election only should have a statistically significant effect for those with higher 
education and little electoral experience. For hypothesis 3 I include a three-way interaction term 
between closeness of election, electoral experience and party attachment. Similarly, because 
closeness should affect those who feel close to a particular party without a habit of voting, I 
predict that closeness should have a statistically significant effect only on this particular group, 
and not otherwise. 
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4.2.6 Assumptions and limitations 
The most important thing I must emphasize is that the dependent variable for the linear 
regression model only have four different possible values. The variable for information seeking 
is scale from 1 to 4. The problems is that the residuals then can’t really by normally distributed. 
I have provided diagnostic plots in the appendix. This includes a density plot of the distribution 
of residuals (also by country), a scatter plot between the residuals and fitted values and a Q-Q 
plot. The residuals seems normally distributed, but when plotting them against the fitted values 
there are clear patterns for each value. A second thing to note is that the linear regression 
assumes the relationship between values on the scale to be equally distant. I originally intended 
to use a multilevel ordered logistic regression, but the available out-of-the-box procedures 
either used days to estimate or failed to converge with the more complex interaction models. I 
have rerun the model for hypothesis 3 and 4 with multilevel logistic regression after recoding 
information seeking into a binary variable (with those who followed the election “fairly closely” 
and “very closely” were coded as one), which yields the same results as those presented in the 
analysis (including quantities of interest).  
 
Both models assumes that the error terms are independent. The CSES sample selection are 
random within districts (in some cases random also across districts), so when I account for the 
district- and country-level dependencies, this assumption should be reasonable. Lastly, all 
regression models assume that the conditional probability distribution between the dependent 
and independent variables are not caused by any other underlying factor. The robustness of the 
theoretical assumptions the statistical models is the only test for this. I would of course argue 
these assumptions are reasonable. I have tried to explicitly state all important choices made 
both regarding modelling and data measurement, so that the analyses can be evaluated with that 
in mind.   
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4.3 Average causal mediation analysis 
 
Hypothesis 5 proposes that closeness of election also may have an indirect effect on voting via 
interest in the election (which I measure as information seeking). To test this I combine the 
“full” linear and logistic models above and estimate how closeness of election might affect 
voting through information seeking (as per Imai et al., 2010a; Imai et al., 2010b; Imai et al., 
2011). Identifying whether there is a causal mechanism is of course no trivial matter. The 
traditional approach to these types of questions have been to use structural equation models 
(Baron and Kenny, 1986; see also e.g., MacKinnon, 2008; Shadish et al., 2002). However, 
mediation analysis is increasingly criticized for various (very legitimate) reasons (Green et al., 
2010: 203; Bullock and Ha, 2011; Heckman and Smith, 1995; Deaton, 2010; Brady and Collier, 
2010). Still, uncovering causal mechanisms is a fundamental goal of political science. The 
inherit difficulty with doing so quantitatively have led some to argue that process tracing, for 
example, is the best approach (Collier et al., 2004). Although I recognize this, I intend to test 
my hypothesis with the data at hand to the best extent possible. For this purpose I use the 
relatively new estimation procedure developed by Imai et al. (2010b; 2011; 2010a; 2013), called 
average causal mediation effect or ACME. By definition it still rests on certain assumptions, 
but less so than traditional approaches using structural equation modeling. Here I will outline 
the method and methodology.  
 
4.3.1 Hypothesis 5: ACME estimation 
For this purpose I define hypothesis 5 as suggesting a process in which closeness of election 
influence voting by using information seeking as the causal pathway to do so. Within the 
potential outcome framework we can exemplify like this (Imai et al., 2011: 768; see also Imai 
et al., 2010b; Pearl, 2000; Rubin, 2004, 1974; Splawa-Neyman et al., 1990): Assume that each 
respondent were treated with two scenarios, one in which the election was close and one in 
which it was not. For each respondent i, let Ti be an indicator taking the value 1 if the election 
was close and 0 otherwise. Then let Mi(t) denote the potential value of information seeking for 
respondent i in election with closeness Ti = t. The potential outcome Yi, i.e. did or did not vote, 
in an election with closeness t and information seeking m for respondent i is then defined as 
Yi(t,m). For example, for hypothesis 5, Yi(1,1) is the potential outcome for respondent i if he/she 
is in a close election and sought out information (assuming we separate between seeking and 
not seeking). The outcome we observed, Yi, can then be written as Yi(Ti, Mi(Ti)), meaning that 
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it is dependent on both Mi(t) and Ti. That means that the total effect of closeness of election for 
respondent i is  
 
  ( )  (1,  (1)) (0,  (0))i i i it Y M Yi M   ,  (1.1) 
 
which means that the mediation effect for closeness t = 0, 1 (assuming it is either close or not) 
is (Imai et al., 2011: 769) 
 
 ( ) ( ,  (1)) ( ,  (0)).i i i i it Y t M Y t M     (1.2) 
 
In other words, hypothesis 5 can be tested by measuring the potential outcome when the 
respondents is in a close election minus the potential outcome when the respondent is in not-
close election, which is dependent on Mi(t). That is, the mediation effect is the change in 
outcome equivalent to the change of information seeking that would be realized in a close 
election, i.e. Mi(0), compared to a not-close election, i.e. Mi(1). If information seeking would 
stay the same in a close election as in one that is not, all else equal, the mediation effect would 
be zero. The average causal mediation effect (ACME) is then the average ( )t , i.e. ( )t . The 
last possible mechanism, the direct effect of closeness, is  
  
 ( ) (1,  ( )) (0,  ( )).i i i i it Y M t Y M t     (1.3) 
 
The problem this highlights is that we cannot observe different outcomes in difference scenarios 
for the same respondent. Instead, I use regression models to predict the different potential 
outcomes for each part of the equation. I did the ACME estimation in two steps. First, I fitted 
regression models for the mediator and the outcome. The mediator model is a multilevel linear 
regression model with information seeking as dependent variable, and the outcome model is a 
multilevel logistic regression model with voting as dependent variable. Based on the mediator 
model, the ACME procedure generate two sets of predictions for information seeking, one for 
when election is close and one for when it is not. I have coded a close election as one with a 
vote share margin of 0, and a not-close election as one with a vote share margin of 20. Second, 
based on the outcome model, the ACME procedure predicts the outcome based on these values. 
For a close election, it first predicts the outcome (i.e. odds of voting) using the value for 
information seeking that it were predicted to have if the election was close. It then predicts the 
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outcome using the value for information seeking that it were predicted to have if the election 
were not close. The ACME is then computed as the average difference between these two 
predictions. The estimation is done using quasi-Bayesian Monte Carlo method with a 1000 
simulations (King et al., 2000; Imai et al., 2010a).  
 
However, there are two limitations to this approach. The first limitation is the sequential 
ignorability assumption (Imai et al., 2011: 770). For inference to be valid in the framework 
outlined above, the distribution of close election—given the other variables—must be 
“ignorable”. That is, the distribution must be independent of the potential outcomes and 
potential mediators. Similarly, information seeking must be assumed “ignorable” given the 
closeness of election and the other variables. This might be difficult even in an experimental 
setting, which highlights the difficulty with studying causal relationship with observation data. 
Although this assumption is untestable, the strength of the ACME procedure is that it comes 
with a sensitivity analysis designed to quantify the degree of possibility of violation. However, 
this test is not yet available for multilevel models. This assumption, then, only rests on the 
theoretical framework. The second limitation is that the ACME procedure cannot, as of yet, 
handle three-level regression models. This means that the respondents in the outcome and 
mediator models are only nested at the country-level. Therefore, in the analysis section, I first 
compare the two-level outcome and mediator models with the three-level models they are based 
on. The mediation analysis—including the outcome and mediation regression models—are with 
the lme4-package (Bates et al., 2008) and the mediation-package (Tingley et al., 2013) in R. 
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4.4 Summary 
I use both linear and logistic multilevel regression models for the empirical analysis. The 
logistic models are for testing hypotheses 1 and 2 where the dependent variable is a binary 
indicator for whether the respondent voted. The linear model are for testing hypotheses 3 and 4 
where the dependent variable is information seeking. For hypothesis 5 I combine both the linear 
and logistic model to estimate the average causal mediation effect, or ACME.  
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5. RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I present the results from the analysis. I start with the results from the multilevel 
logistic regression model with voting as dependent variable. This is to test the effect of closeness 
conditionally on other variables. The second section have information seeking as dependent 
variable in a linear multilevel regression model in order to test how closeness of election might 
affect information seeking directly. In the last section I present the results from the mediation 
analysis. I will go through the analysis in the following way: I first go through “the reference 
models”. They are reference models because I only use them for diagnostics and not for 
inference per se. I then go through the regression models including interaction terms one at a 
time, which all are estimated with a specific hypothesis in mind.  
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5.1 Closeness of election and voting 
 
In this section I test the relationship between closeness of election and voting using individual-
level turnout as dependent variable. These are multilevel logistic regression models with a 
binary dependent variable indicating whether the respondent cast a ballot or not. As discussed 
earlier in the theory chapter, I am interested in whether the effect of closeness might by 
conditional on a series of demand-side factors. I expect that the effect of closeness of election 
is conditional on habit and information seeking. I use electoral experience as a proxy for 
measuring habit, and expect the marginal effect of closeness to be negligible for individuals 
that have a high degree of experience (and hence vote because of habit). I also hypothesize 
about two types of links between the closeness of an election and information seeking: Either 
people that are more engaged in an election should be more influenced by a close election (i.e. 
a contingent effect), or a close election should increase engagement which in turn affects the 
decision to vote (i.e. an indirect effect). I address the direct relationship between closeness and 
information seeking in the next section. Here I estimate a model to test whether the effect of 
closeness is contingent on information seeking behavior, conditionally on habit. 
  
 
5.1.1 Reference models (2.0-2.3) 
 
The reference models are presented in Table 5. The first model (2.0) is the null model, and it 
only contains the intercept and variance between and within districts and countries (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008). AIC and BIC is 25094 and 25119. The deviance is 25088. These 
numbers will serve as reference for the rest of model. As explained in the methods chapter, the 
intra-class correlation is an estimation of the proportion of variance between (rather than within) 
district-elections and between countries. The null model have an intra-class correlation of 23.5 
percent at the country-level and 26.2 percent at the district-level. This indicates that there is 
great deal of variation is between different district-elections and countries, and that a multilevel 
model indeed is warranted (see e.g. Hox, 2010: 47-50). In model 2.1 I introduce the level-1 
variables attachment to party, information seeking, efficacy, experience, age, age squared, 
higher education and female. This made the AIC and BIC decreased to 19,849 and 19,942, 
respectively. The deviance decreased to 19,827. The intra-class correlation also decreased from 
23.5 percent to 17.7 percent at the country-level and from 26.2 to 20.3 at the district-level. In 
addition, the random intercept for countries decreased from 1.049 to .751 and from .117 to .093 
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for districts. This means that the individual-level variables are able to account for a chunk of 
the variance at the district- and country-level.  All variables are statistically significant and have 
coefficients in the expected direction.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Multilevel logistic regression models of closeness of election and individual-level voting (odds ratio) 
 Model (2.0) Model (2.1) Model (2.2) Model (2.3) 
 OR (𝑝) OR (𝑝) OR (𝑝) OR (𝑝) 
Fixed effects     
    Closeness of election   1.011 (.037)* 1.007 (.186) 
    Attachment to party  1.554 (.000)*** 1.556 (.000)*** 1.556 (.000)*** 
    Information-seeking  2.067 (.000)*** 2.062 (.000)*** 2.057 (.000)*** 
    Efficacy  1.174 (.000)*** 1.175 (.000)*** 1.175 (.000)*** 
    Experience  1.245 (.000)*** 1.245 (.000)*** 1.245 (.000)*** 
    Age  1.041 (.000)*** 1.040 (.000)*** 1.040 (.000)*** 
    Age (squared)    .999 (.000)***   .999 (.000)***   .999 (.000)*** 
    Higher education  1.668 (.000)*** 1.667 (.000)*** 1.668 (.000)*** 
    Female  1.078 (.045)* 1.070 (.045)* 1.079 (.044)* 
    District magnitude   1.002 (.584) 1.003 (.421) 
    Compulsory voting    5.860 (.000)** 
    Proportional Repr.      .732 (.343) 
    FH rating      .613 (.004)* 
Random effects     
    var (𝑢0𝑗): intercept (cntry) 1.049 .751 .791 .484 
    var (𝑢0𝑗𝑘): intercept (dist.) .117 .093 .0.87 .084 
Model summary     
    ICC (𝑟ℎ𝑜)=cntry. lvl. .235 .177 .190 .126 
    ICC (𝑟ℎ𝑜)= dist. lvl. .262 .203 .211 .147 
    −2𝐿𝐿 25088.359 19827.032 19822.075 19802.932 
    AIC 25094.36 19849.03 19848.07 19834.93 
    BIC 25119.83 19942.41 19958.43 19970.75 
   𝑛=resp./dist./countries. 35913/1444/26 35913/1444/26 35913/1444/26 35913/1444/26 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05, two-tailed. Dependent variable is 1/0 indicating if resp. voted in last election.  
 
 
 
Model 2.2 also includes the district-level variables, closeness of election and district magnitude. 
The model does not perform particularly better than the model with only individual-level 
variables. Deviance only decreased slightly from 19827 in the previous model to 19822. 
Although AIC stayed about the same, BIC actually increased from 19942.41 to 19958.4. In 
addition, the intra-class correlation increased from 17.7 percent to 19 percent at the country-
level and from 20.3 percent to 21.1 percent at the district-level. In other words, including 
closeness of election in the regression model does not exactly increase the performance 
compared to the previous model. The coefficient of closeness of election is positive and 
statistical significant with a p-value of .37. However, this is probably because I have not 
   
  65 
 
controlled for different types of electoral systems. District magnitude, on the other hand, is not 
statistically significant.  
 
In model 2.3 I introduce the country-level variables, proportional representation, compulsory 
voting and Freedom House rating. This is model includes all variables used in the analysis. The 
AIC decreased from 19848 to 19834 and the deviance from 19822 to 19802, although BIC 
increased. In this sense the model performs about the same as the ones not including national-
level variables. Intra-class correlation, however, went down from 19 to 12.6 percent at the 
country-level and from 21.1 to 14.7 percent at the district-level. The variance of the random 
intercept for the country-level went from .791 to .484 and the district-level from .211 to .084. 
The large decrease in both intra-class correlation and variance of the intercept shows that these 
variables are able to bite of a significant portion of the variance at the higher level. All in all, 
the variables performs as expected. Both compulsory voting and Freedom House Rating are 
statistically significant. The dummy variable for proportional representation, however, is not. 
Notably, the slightly statistically significant effect of closeness of election found in model 2.2 
is now gone.  
 
 
5.1.2 Interaction models (2.4-2.7) 
 
If we were to conclude only the basis of the regression models above, we would probably argue 
that the closeness of an election seems unrelated to the decision to vote (at least on average). 
Now I turn to the main analysis in which closeness of election is the focus explanatory variable 
and electoral experience, information seeking and party attachment, in turn, are moderator 
variables. The multilevel models with interaction terms are presented in Table 6. I have four 
model with interactions terms. Model 2.4 and 2.5 includes an interaction term between 
closeness of election and electoral experience. I expect that the habit of voting moderates the 
decision-making process so that it constraints the role any supply- and demand side mechanisms 
may have on the actual act (hypothesis 1). More concretely, I expect the marginal effect of 
closeness of election to decrease as the electoral experience increase. I test this by including 
said interaction term and calculating the marginal effect of closeness over different values for 
electoral experience. In model 2.4 I exclude the demand-side factors, i.e. attachment to party, 
information seeking and efficacy. If the relationship between supply- and demand-side factors 
are as I hypothesize, including them should distort the picture because the relationship between 
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electoral experience and closeness of election is dependent on the demand-side factors. Because 
the impact of closeness of election actually depends on the values of these other variables, and 
because they are (by definition) the primary predictors of voting, they should account better for 
the variance preciously explained by closeness of election. The demand-side factors are put 
back in in model 2.5 to test this assumption. In model 2.6 I include a three-way interaction term 
between information seeking, closeness of election and electoral experience. This is to test 
whether the effect of closeness of election is contingent on information seeking, while still 
assuming they are both moderated by habit (hypothesis 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Multilevel logistic regression models of closeness of election and individual-
level voting, with interaction terms (odds ratio) 
 Model (2.4) Model (2.5) Model (2.6) 
 OR (𝑝) OR (𝑝) OR (𝑝) 
Fixed effects    
    Closeness of election 1.001 (.924) 1.000 (.972)   .969 (.011)* 
    Attachment to party  1.557 (.000)*** 1.556 (.000)*** 
    Information seeking  2.056 (.000)*** 1.227 (.304) 
    Efficacy  1.175 (.000)*** 1.175 (.000)*** 
    Experience 1.231 (.000)*** 1.161 (.000)*** 1.127 (.108) 
    Age 1.028 (.000)*** 1.040 (.000)*** 1.040 (.000)*** 
    Age (squared)   .999 (.000)***  .999  (.000)***   .999 (.000)*** 
    Higher education 2.038 (.000)*** 1.661 (.000)*** 1.656 (.000)*** 
    Female   .953 (.180) 1.080 (.043)* 1.077 (.051) 
    Closeness * Exp. 1.001 (.024) 1.002 (.008)** 1.003 (.068) 
    Closeness * Inf. Seeking   1.014 (.003)** 
    Clsnss. * Inf.Skn. * Exp.     .999 (.248) 
    Exp. * Inf. Seeking   1.019 (.533) 
    District magnitude 1.003 (.441) 1.003 (.424) 1.003 (.416) 
    Compulsory voting 8.459 (.000)*** 5.893 (.000)*** 5.729 (.000)*** 
    Proportional Repr.   .593 (.184)   .732 (.341)   .740 (.359) 
    FH rating   .461 (.000)***   .600 (.003)**   .605 (.003)** 
Random effects    
    var (𝑢0𝑗): intercept (cntry) .719 .479 .483 
    var (𝑢0𝑗𝑘): intercept (dist.) .100 .083 .083 
Model summary    
    ICC (𝑟ℎ𝑜)=cntry. lvl. .175 .124 .125 
    ICC (𝑟ℎ𝑜)= dist. lvl. .199 .146 .147 
    −2𝐿𝐿 21960.102 19796.068 19776.122 
    AIC 21988.1 19830.07 19816.12 
    BIC 22106.95 19974.38 19985.9 
   𝑛=resp./dist./countries. 35913/1444/26 35913/1444/26 35913/1444/26 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05, two-tailed. Dependent variable is 1/0 indicating if resp. 
voted in the last election. 
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As expected, when excluding the demand-side factors and including the interaction term, the 
performance of the model decrease substantially (model 2.5 in Table 6). The AIC and BIC went 
up from 19834.9 and 19970.7 in model 2.3 to 21988.1 and 22107, respectively, in model 2.4. 
Deviance goes from 19802.3 to 21960.1. In addition, variance at both upper levels increased 
substantially. The variance of the intercept goes from .484 to .719 for the country-level and 
from .084 to .100 for the district-level. The intra-class correlation increased from 12.6 and 14.7 
for the country-level and district-level, respectively, to 17.2 and 19.9. This really emphasizes 
the importance of the demand-side factors for the performance of the model. The coefficient 
for Closeness of election remains not statistically significant. The coefficient for the interaction 
term between closeness and experience is also not statistically significant, and neither is the 
variable for gender. The other variables perform similarly as before. However, I am interested 
in the quantities of interest and not the mean odds ratio.  Figure 12 plots the estimated marginal 
effect of closeness of election (the y-axis) over different values of electoral experience (the x-
axis). The marginal effect is the approximation of how much the dependent variable is expected 
to increase or decrease for a unit change in the independent variable. The vertical bands 
represents the 95 percent confidence intervals. The effect is regarded as statistically significant 
(at alpha=.05) as long as these bands does not overlap the x-axis. In line with my hypothesis, 
the figure shows that the marginal effect of closeness increases substantially as electoral 
experience decreases. Consequently, the plot seems to provide prima facie evidence that the 
impact of closeness is stronger the less likely someone is to have a habit of voting.  
 
The second model (2.5 in Table 6) have the same interaction-term but includes the demand-
side factors: Information seeking, efficacy and party attachment. If we assume that the effect of 
closeness of election is conditional on electoral experience as well as information seeking and 
party attachment, the marginal predictions should change. The regression model does not 
account for the difference between, e.g., someone very interested in the election, and someone 
very interested in a close election (and interest is always a good predictor)2. However, in terms 
of goodness-of-fit, the model performs better than model 2.4, but is comparable to model 2.3 
(same but without the interaction term). AIC decreased slightly from 19835 to 19830, but BIC 
increased from 19971 to 19975. The random intercept and the intra-class correlation also 
remains essentially the same. In terms of sheer “performance numbers”, this model is equal to 
model 2.3. The coefficient for closeness of election remains non-statistically significant, but the 
                                                 
2 Although it have been debated how well logistic regression models account for interactions naturally when 
excluding interaction terms (see Rainey, 2014). 
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interaction term is now statistically significant with a (at p=.008). The coefficient for gender is 
now statistically significant again. All other variables have the same direction of effect and 
statistical significant levels as before. When I estimate the marginal effect again (Figure 13), 
we see that the distinctive relationship between closeness of election and electoral experience 
found in model 2.4 now is gone. This time there seems to be no relationship between the margin 
of victory and voting. The marginal effect is not statistically significant for individuals with 
electoral experience less than 8. Although the marginal effect is statistically significant when 
electoral experience is between 10 and 20, the effect size is negligible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: The marginal effect of closeness by electoral experience when not including motivational 
factors in the regression model (model 2.4) 
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Figure 13: The marginal effect of closeness by electoral experience when including motivational factors in 
the regression model (model 2.5) 
 
 
 
Next, we turn to model 2.6, where I include a three-way interaction term between closeness of 
election, information seeking and electoral experience (Table 6). Here I am interested in testing 
my hypothesis that the effect of closeness is conditional on information seeking. In other words, 
whether information seeking moderates the effect of closeness of election, still assuming that it 
is conditional on electoral experience. This means that I expect the dependency between 
closeness of election and electoral experience we saw in Figure 12 to be true for voters that are 
more than average engaged in campaign, but not for others. This model performs similarly to 
2.5 in terms of goodness-of-fit. Although deviance is reduced from 19796 to 19776 and AIC 
from 19830 to 19816, BIC increases from 1974 to 19986. The variance of the country- and 
district-level intercept is virtually the same, as is the intra-class correlation. Including the 
interaction terms, in other words, does not explain any more or less of higher-level variance. 
The variable for gender is now not statistically significant. The coefficient for closeness of 
election is now statistically significant with a p value of .011, but in the opposite direction (odds 
ratio of .994). Interestingly, the coefficients for information seeking and experience is no longer 
statically significant, but the interaction term between closeness and information seeking is.  
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Figure 14: The marginal effect of closeness by electoral experience and information seeking (model 2.6) 
 
 
 
I have plotted the marginal effect of closeness by electoral experience over different values of 
information seeking in Figure 14. The x-axis is again the level of electoral experience and the 
y-axis is the estimated mean marginal effect. Each of the four subplots represent one of the four 
levels of information seeking.  The plot support my hypothesis that the effect of closeness is 
conditional on habit and information seeking: The average marginal effect of closeness is 
statistically significant and increasing as the electoral experience decreases for voters that 
followed the campaign, in contrast to those that did not. The effect is either not statistically 
significant or negligible for individuals that did not follow the campaign at all. The effect size, 
however, is quite small. The average adjusted predictions from model 2.4 are presented in Table 
7. A “close elections” are elections with a margin of victory of less than five percent. Individuals 
with “no experience” are those that did not vote in the previous election. We would expect the 
probability for someone with no experience that followed the campaign very closely would be 
marginally higher in a close election. The predicted probability of voting for this group only 
increase by 2.1 percentage points from 88.6 percent to 90.7 percent when the election is close. 
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In other words, the analysis support the hypothesis that there is a conditional relationship 
between closeness of election, information seeking and electoral experience.  
 
 
 
Table 7: Predicted probability of voting by electoral experience,  
closeness of election and information seeking based on model 2.5  
(SD in parenthesis)  
  How closely did you follow the 
campaign? 
  Not closely at all Very closely 
No experience Close .292 (.041) .907 (.016) 
No experience Not close .386 (.043) .886 (.020) 
Experienced Close  .742 (.035) .979 (.004) 
Experienced Not close .777 (.031) .974 (.005) 
Average adjusted prediction estimated from model 2.5; Standard Errors in parentheses. 
Note: “Close” and “not close” refers to closeness of election. An election is 
“close” if the margin of victory is less than five and “not close” otherwise.  
“Experienced” voters are voters that reported they voted in the last election,  
and people with “no experience” are those that did not. 
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5.2 Closeness of election and information seeking 
 
The regression models above supports the proposition that the effect of closeness is contingent 
on habit and interest in the election. However, I also expect the relationship between closeness 
of election and information seeking to be more complex. In this section I examine the direct 
relationship between closeness of election and information seeking proposed in hypotheses 3 
and 4. I use a multilevel linear regression models with level of information seeking as dependent 
variable. To recall, the information seeking variable is a four point scale measuring to what 
extent the respondent followed the campaign3. I expect closeness of election to increase 
information seeking more generally for high-resource individuals (hypothesis 3), following the 
resource model of participation. In addition, I expect that voters that are close to a particular 
party may seek out more information about the campaign in a close election because of group-
based loyalties (hypothesis 4). This is an iteration of the mobilization hypothesis more rooted 
in cognitive psychology than sociology: A closer election increase the outcome at stake for 
political parties, triggering “root for the team”-like behavior for people that feel attached to 
some particular party.  
 
 
 
5.2.1 Reference models (3.0, 3.1 and 3.2) 
 
All reference models are shown in Table 8. Model 3.0 is the null model, which only contains 
the variance within and between countries. The deviance is 85914.9, the AIC 85922.9 and BIC 
85956.9. These numbers serve as baseline reference for the models 3.2-3.3. The intra-class 
correlation is 9.8 percent at the country-level and 14 percent at the district-level. As expected, 
this indicates that the proportion of variance at the country- and district-level is more than 
enough to warrant a multilevel model. The variance within districts is .032 and the variance 
within countries is .072. In model 3.1 I introduce the first-level variables attachment to party, 
efficacy, electoral experience, age, age squared, higher education and female. I use the same 
                                                 
3 As noted in the method section, having a four valued scale as dependent variable is often problematic when using 
a linear model because the residual are not normally distributed. I originally intended to employ a multilevel 
ordered logistic regression, but the available out-of-the-box procedures either used days to estimate or failed to 
converge with the more complex interaction models. I have rerun the analysis with multilevel logistic regression 
after recoding information seeking into a binary variable, which yields the exactly the same results (including 
quantities of interest). 
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explanatory variables as in the voter model. AIC and BIC in this model decreases from 85923 
and 85957 to 79879 and 79897, respectively. Deviance decreases from 85915 to 79878. This 
all confirms that model 3.1 is a better fit. The within-district variance is about same, down from 
.30 to .32. The within-country variance, however, decreased a bit more from .072 to .054. In 
accordance with our expectations, Intra-class correlation went from 98 percent to 88 percent at 
the country-level and from .143 to .137 at the district-level. All these numbers indicate that 
model 3.1 is a better model than the null model. Although my focus here is on closeness of 
election, the individual-level variables that also were statistically significant predictors in the 
turnout model is also statistically significant here: Attachment to party, efficacy, electoral 
experience, age and higher education have positive and statistically significant coefficients. 
This indicates that the effects of these variables on the decision to vote also can be indirect.   
 
 
 
Table 8: Multilevel linear regression models of closeness of election and information seeking 
Dep. Var.: Information 
seeking 
Model (3.0) Model (3.1) Model (3.2) 
 Coef. (𝑝) Coef. (𝑝) Coef. (𝑝) 
Fixed effects    
    Closeness of election    .0024 (.061) 
    Attachment to party   .2369 (.000)***  .2366 (.000)*** 
    Efficacy   .0729 (.000)***  .0730 (.000)*** 
    Experience   .0286 (.000)***  .0286 (.000)*** 
    Age   .0034 (.000)***  .0033 (.012)* 
    Age (squared)  -.0000 (.009)** -.0000 (.000)*** 
    Higher education   .1720 (.000)***  .1717 (.000)*** 
    Female  -.1577 (.000)*** -.1574 (.000)*** 
    District magnitude   -.0016 (.207) 
    Compulsory voting    .2235 (.114) 
    Proportional Repr.   -.2752 (.011)* 
    FH rating   -.3544 (.000)*** 
Random effects    
    var (𝑢0𝑗): intercept (cntry) .072 .054 .056 
    var (𝑢0𝑗𝑘): intercept (dist.) .032 .030 .026 
Model summary    
    ICC (𝑟ℎ𝑜)=cntry. lvl. .098 .088 .093 
    ICC (𝑟ℎ𝑜)= dist. lvl. .143 .137 .136 
    −2𝐿𝐿 85914.92 79877.60 79811.78 
    AIC 85922.92 79899.6 79843.78 
    BIC 85956.87 79992.98 79979.6 
   𝑛=resp./dist./countries. 35913/1444/26 35913/1444/26 35913/1444/26 
***p<0,001; **p<0,01; *p<0,05, two-tailed. 
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Model 3.2 includes both the district- and national-level variables. I added closeness of election, 
district magnitude, compulsory voting, PR and Freedom House rating. These variables—with 
the exception of closeness of election—are not included as predictors of interest per se. This 
makes the AIC decrease from 79878 to 19812 and BIC decrease from 19993 to 19980. The 
deviance also went down from 79878 to 79812. The within-district variance decreased from 
.030 to .026, while within-country variance actually increase slightly from .054 to .056. The 
proportion of variance at the district level is about the same as in model 3.1. Overall, introducing 
the higher-level variables increases the goodness-of-fit. Proportional representation and 
Freedom House rating have negative and statistically significant slope coefficients. 
Interestingly, this indicates that individuals in PR countries on average pay much less attention 
to the election than those in majoritarian and mixed systems. 
 
 
Table 9: Multilevel linear regression on information seeking, with interaction terms 
Dep. Var.: Information 
seeking 
Model (3.3) Model (3.4) 
 Coef. (𝑝) Coef. (𝑝) 
Fixed effects   
    Closeness of election  .0018 (.235) -.0009 (.733) 
    Attachment to party  .2367 (.000)***  .1561 (.003)** 
    Efficacy  .0723 (.000)***  .0728 (.000)*** 
    Experience  .0275 (.000)***  .0029 (.826) 
    Age  .0031 (.019)**  .0030 (.021)* 
    Age (squared)  .0000 (.000)*** -.0000 (.000)*** 
    Higher education -.0195 (.830)  .1709 (.000)*** 
    Female -.1569 (.000)*** -.1569 (.000)*** 
    Closeness * Exp.  .0000 (.902)  .0007 (.015)* 
    Closeness * Higher Edu.  .0041 (.051)  
    Close. * Exp. * High. Edu. -.0005 (.100)  
    Exp. * Higher Edu.  .0223 (.064)  
    Closeness * Att.   .0024 (.047)* 
    Closeness * Att. * Exp.  -.0005 (.002)** 
    Att. * Exp.   .0171 (.011)* 
    District magnitude -.0015 (.212) -.0016 (.193) 
    Compulsory voting  .2254 (.116)  .2198 (.111) 
    Proportional Repr. -.2729 (.014)* -.2770 (.009)** 
    FH rating -.3606 (.000)*** -.3439 (.000)*** 
Random effects   
    var (𝑢0𝑗): intercept (cntry) .058 .053 
    var (𝑢0𝑗𝑘): intercept (dist.) .026 .026 
Model summary   
    ICC (𝑟ℎ𝑜)=cntry. lvl. .095 .088 
    ICC (𝑟ℎ𝑜)= dist. lvl. .138 .131 
    −2𝐿𝐿 79805.49 79791.64 
    AIC 79845.49 79831.64 
    BIC 80015.27 80001.42 
   𝑛=resp./dist./countries. 35913/1444/26 35913/1444/26 
***p<0,001; **p<0,01; *p<0,05, two-tailed. 
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5.2.2 Interaction models (3.3 and 3.4) 
 
Now we turn to model 3.3. This model includes an interaction term between closeness of 
election, electoral experience, and higher education. I hypothesized that high-resource 
individuals without the habit of voting should pay more attention to the election when then race 
is close (hypothesis 4).  In terms of goodness-of-fit, introducing the interaction term does not 
make much difference if we compare it to model 3.2. The AIC and BIC goes from 79844 and 
79980 to 79845 and 80015, respectively. The deviance decreases slightly from 79812 to 79805. 
Intra-class correlation goes from 9.3 percent at country-level and 13.6 percent at the district-
level to 5.8 percent and 13.8 percent, respectively. In short, the higher-level variance measures 
stays the same. Regarding the covariates, the slope coefficient for the interaction term is 
statistically significant, while not higher education. Note that this is normal in a linear model 
with interactions terms because the coefficient now refers to slope when all the variables it 
interact with are zero, so the statistical significance test is only based on the regression surface 
in this peculiar region of the predictor space. To interpret the interaction term I have plotted 
point estimates of the marginal effect of closeness by electoral experience and higher education 
in Figure 15. The marginal effect in a linear regression is equivalent to the relevant conditional 
slope coefficient. In line with my hypothesis, we see that the marginal effect closeness of 
election only is statistically significant for individuals with higher education and electoral 
experience lower than 7. In addition, for this group we see that the effect size is clearly 
increasing as the electoral experience decreases.  
 
Now we turn to model 3.4 (Table 4), where I include an interaction term between closeness of 
election, electoral experience, and party attachment. I expect that closeness of election have a 
higher marginal effect on information seeking for individuals that feel close to a particular party 
and that have not gained the habit of voting (hypothesis 4). The goodness-of-fit is better than 
3.3, but more or less the same as the reference model (3.2). The AIC and BIC are now 79832 
and 80001 compared to 79844 and 79980 in 3.2. The deviance decreased from 79812 to 79792. 
There was a slight decrease in the proportion of variance at the higher levels. The intra-class 
correlation is now 13.1 percent for the district-level and 8.8 percent for country-level down 
from 13.6 and 9.3 before. The variance of the country-level varying intercept went from .056 
to .053 and stayed the same for the district-level. Now the coefficient for electoral experience 
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Figure 15: The marginal effect of closeness of election on information seeking by electoral experience and 
education (model 3.3) 
 
 
 
Figure 16: The marginal effect of closeness of election on information seeking by degree of closeness to party 
and electoral experience (model 3.3) 
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is not statistically significant, but all interaction terms are. Otherwise the main effects are the 
same as before. I have plotted the marginal effect of closeness of election by electoral 
experience and party attachment in Figure 16. The variable for party attachment have tree 
values, so here I leave out the middle value (the marginal effect was not statistically significant, 
i.e. all bands overlapped the y-axis). We see the exact same pattern as expected: The effect of 
closeness is primarily statistically significant only for individuals with that feels very close to 
a party with little electoral experience. The effect is also statistically significant for those with 
an electoral experience between 5 and 15, however with a smaller magnitude of effect. This is 
in line with my hypothesis that those with close attachment to a party—and with little electoral 
experience—will pay more attention to the campaign in close election.  
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5.3 Causal Mediation Analysis 
Identifying whether there is a causal mechanism as proposed in hypothesis five is no easy trivial 
matter. My conjecture is that closeness of election also affects the decision to vote through 
information seeking (H5). The results from the regression analysis above suggests that the 
closeness of an election affects information seeking directly. The crucial step from the previous 
section to here is that I ask whether effect of closeness on information seeking also translates 
into a higher chance of someone casting a ballot. In other words, I have estimated the effect of 
closeness of election and information seeking on voting, and the effect of closeness of election 
on information seeking. By joining the two parts of this causal chain, I will now test if 
information seeking mediates the relationship between closeness of election and voting. As 
outlined in the method section, I estimated the average causal mediation effect or “ACME” 
(Imai et al., 2010a; Imai et al., 2010b; Imai et al., 2011). The ACME can be interpreted as the 
difference in the probability of voting when information seeking takes the value it would realize 
under a close election as opposed to one that is not, while other control variables are held 
constant. The direct effect of closeness on voting (average direct effect, or ADE) is the expected 
difference in probability of voting when the closeness of an election is changed but information 
seeking is held constant. The sum of the two is the average treatment effect (ATE). 
 
There are two cautions I must repeat once more before proceeding with the analysis. First, the 
mediation package in R which implement the ACME estimation does not yet support multilevel 
models with more than two levels (Tingley et al., 2013). This means that the outcome and 
mediator regression models used for this estimation, although they are equal to model 2.6 and 
3.4 otherwise, are treated as two-level models only accounting for country as the second level 
(and hence does not have a varying intercept at the district-level as well). Second, and more 
important, because I evidently did not observe whether the same respondent’s voted in both or 
either a close and non-close election, I rely on the assumption of sequential ignorability. 
Assuming sequential ignorability means assuming (i) that the effect of closeness of election—
conditional on the other covariates—is independent of the information seeking and voting 
outcome, and (ii) that information seeking is independent of voting given the other covariates.  
In other words, that information seeking and voting is distributed in the sample as they would 
be if they were randomly assigned across close and none-close elections (given the control 
variables). The advantage of the ACME procedure by (Imai et al. (2010b)) is that it includes 
sensitivity analyses which can test the robustness of this assumption. However, such sensitivity 
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analyses are not available when using multilevel or logistic regression models as of yet. My 
ACME results must therefore be reviewed with this in mind. 
 
 
 
Table 10: Two-level regression models used as outcome and mediator model in the mediation analysis 
compared with three-level regression models 
 Mediator model Model 3.2 Outcome model Model 2.3 
 Only district-level District- and 
country-level 
Only district-
level 
District- and 
country-level 
 Multilevel linear model Multilevel logistic model 
 Dep.var.= Information seeking Dep.var.= Voting 
 Coef. (𝑝) Coef. (𝑝) OR (𝑝) OR (𝑝) 
Fixed effects     
    Closeness of election  .0030 (.023)*  .0024 (.061) 1.008 (.074) 1.007 (.186) 
    Attachment to party  .0280 (.000)***  .2366 (.000)*** 1.547 (.000)*** 1.556 (.000)*** 
    Information seeking   2.046 (.000)*** 2.057 (.000)*** 
    Efficacy  .0717 (.000)***  .0730 (.000)*** 1.173 (.000)*** 1.175 (.000)*** 
    Experience  .0281 (.000)***  .0286 (.000)*** 1.243 (.000)*** 1.245 (.000)*** 
    Age  .0032 (.001)***  .0033 (.012)* 1.040 (.000)*** 1.040 (.000)*** 
    Age (squared) -.0000 (.025)* -.0000 (.000)***  .999 (.000)***   .999 (.000)*** 
    Higher education  .1771 (.001)***  .1717 (.000)*** 1.673 (.000)*** 1.668 (.000)*** 
    Female -.1568 (.002)** -.1574 (.000)*** 1.076 (.050) 1.079 (.044)* 
    District magnitude  .0014 (.156) -.0016 (.207) 1.004 (.185) 1.003 (.421) 
    Compulsory voting  .3026 (.936)  .2235 (.114) 5.857 (.000)*** 5.860 (.000)** 
    Proportional Repr. -.3028 (.161) -.2752 (.011)*  .699 (.276)   .732 (.343) 
    FH rating -.5186 (.006)** -.3544 (.000)***  .621 (.003)**   .613 (.004)* 
Random effects     
    var (𝑢0𝑗): intercept (cntry) .211 (.056) .498 (.484) 
Model summary     
    ICC (𝑟ℎ𝑜)=cntry. lvl. .280 (.093)  (.126) 
    −2𝐿𝐿 80068.99 79811.78 19824.2 19802.932 
    AIC 80214.18 79843.78 19854.2 19834.93 
    BIC 80341.52 79979.6 19981.5 19970.75 
   𝑛=resp./dist./countries. 35913/1444/26 35913/1444/26 35913/1444/26 35913/1444/26 
***p<0,001; **p<0,01; *p<0,05, two-tailed. 
 
 
 
 
The mediator and outcome model are presented in Table 10. The mediator model is the model 
with information seeking as dependent variable (based on model 3.2), and the outcome model 
is the model with voting as dependent variable (based on model 2.3). Because the ACME 
estimation does not support more than two levels, I compare them to the “correct” model with 
three levels to see if there is any sign major discrepancies. The first notable thing about the 
mediator model is that closeness of election is statistically significant contrary to the three-level 
model, while proportional representation is not. This is probably due to underestimated 
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standard errors, because the model do not account for the fact within-district cluster are 
correlated (Hox, 2010: 5; Stevens, 2012), which was what I feared. This means that the ACME 
estimates probably are biased in the same way and hence much less reliable. The second notable 
thing is the increase in proportion of variance at the country-level. This is of course not that 
unexpected, because the correlation between closeness and information seeking measured on 
respondents from the same district are not accounted for in the same way. Otherwise, the model 
is more or less completely the same. The outcome model, however, does not seem to suffer (on 
the outset, at least) from the same problem, although the p-value of closeness indeed is lower.  
 
 
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Total
Effect
ADE
ACME
 
Figure 17: ACME point estimates of mediation analysis of closeness of election and information seeking 
Black bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. The ACME is the estimated indirect effect of closeness on 
voting through information seeking, the ADE is the estimated direct effect, and the sum of the two is the total 
effect. 
 
 
 
Table 11 shows the results from the mediation analysis. The point estimates are also displayed 
graphically in Figure 17. They report the direct effect of closeness of election on the probability 
of voting (ADE), its indirect effect via information seeking (ACME), and the total effect. 
Because the “treatment” variable is continuous, the ACME point estimates are split between a 
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“control” and a “treatment” value, and the average between two are estimates plotted. 
“Treatment” is set at 50, i.e. a margin victory near zero, and “control” at 30, i.e. a margin of 
about 20 percentage points. In line with my hypothesis, closeness of election also seem to 
exercise a statistically significant effect through information seeking, while it does not seem to 
have any direct effect. Although this is in favor of the theory presented earlier, it can merely be 
suggestive evidence, if anything, because of the many pitfalls.  
 
 
 
Table 11: Causal Mediation Analysis of closeness of election and  
information seeking 
Outcome: Voting , Treatment: Closeness Model (4) 
Mediator: Information seeking Coef.  (𝑝-value) 
Point Estimates  
    ACME  (not close election) .00377 (0.00)*** 
    ACME  (close election) .00347 (0.00)*** 
    ADE   (not close election) .01419 (0.09) 
    ADE  (close election) .01389 (0.09) 
    Total Effect .01766 (0.04) 
    Prop. Mediated (not close election) .20726 (0.04) 
    Prop. Mediated (close election) .18872 (0.04) 
    ACME   (average) .00362 (0.00)*** 
    ADE    (average) .01404 (0.09) 
    Prop. Mediated (average) .19799 (0.04) 
Model  summary  
    Simulations 1000 
    𝑛=respondents/countries 35913/26 
***p<0,001; **p<0,01; *p<0,05.  
Note: Outcome and mediator model are specified in Table 10. 
“Close election” = 50 (i.e. zero margin), “not close election” = 
30 (i.e. a margin of 20 percentage points).  
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I summarize the results from the analysis and present the conclusion. I start by 
evaluating the results for each hypothesis. After that I provide a conclusion. 
 
  
   
  83 
6.1 Summarizing the results 
 
In short, the analysis found support for all hypotheses except one.  Table 12 provides an 
overview of the hypotheses and their subsequent faring in the analysis. In other words, closeness 
of election can have an impact by different mechanisms for different people. Here I briefly 
discuss the results for each hypothesis in turn. 
 
My first hypothesis was on the role of habit, and how it should affect the way closeness of 
election can have an impact on behavior. I built on the developmental framework of voting, and 
argued that closeness of election should not affect those with the habit of voting (H1). This 
hypothesis was applicable to all other test as well, all which lend support. Throughout the 
analysis, the role of habit seems clear: The more electoral experience the respondent had, the 
less likely it was for the closeness of election to have an impact. This highlights the important 
contribution of the developmental framework of voting. Inertia shapes the role of the context.  
 
Table 12: Hypotheses and results 
 Hypothesis Theory Variables Evaluation 
1 Closeness of election does not affect the decision 
to vote for those with the habit of voting 
DM Electoral experience Supported 
2 Closeness of election affects the decision to vote 
for people that are interested in the election and do 
not have a habit of voting 
HSM Information seeking,     
electoral experience 
Supported 
3 Closeness of election affects the interest in the 
election for people with higher education that does 
not have a habit of voting 
MH, RM, 
DM 
Education, 
electoral experience 
Supported 
4 Closeness of election affects the interest in the 
election for people that feel close to a political 
party and that do not have a habit of voting 
MH, HSM Party attachment, 
electoral experience 
Supported 
5 Closeness of election affects voting through 
interest in the election 
(combined) Information seeking Inconclusive 
Note: DM = the developmental model of voting, HSM = heuristic-systematic model of information processing, 
RM = the resource model of participation, MH = the mobilization hypothesis 
 
My next hypothesis was that closeness of election affects the decision to vote for people that 
are interested in the election and do not have a habit of voting (H2). This also found support. 
There was clear difference between those who reported that they followed the election “very 
closely” or “fairly closely”, and those followed it “not very closely” or “not closely at all”. For 
those least interested closeness clearly did not matter. For those who followed it “very closely” 
and “fairly closely” the role of electoral experience was underscored. The less electoral 
experience, the more does closeness of election affect the decision to vote. 
 
   
  84 
I also expected that people with higher education that does not have a habit of voting should be 
more interested in election when the race is close (H3). The results clearly show a fundamental 
difference between those with higher education and those without. For those with little electoral 
experience and higher education, a closer election seems to fuel more interest. This is key 
because of the importance of interest for participation. Even Brady et al. (1995: 283) recognizes 
its importance over other variables when it comes to voting.  
 
The third hypothesis was that closeness of election should affect the interest in the election for 
people that feel close to a political party and that do not have a habit of voting (H4). When 
calculating the marginal effect and contrasting those who feel “not very close” with those that 
“feel “very close”, we see this exact thing. Those that feel very close to a party and have little 
electoral experience clearly seems to get more interested in a closer election. Noticeable, 
however, closeness of election also have statistically significant effect on those who are not 
close to a party with a medium degree of electoral experience. The effect size is very small, 
also relative to how much it seems to affect those who are very close to a party, but in the bigger 
picture, both are quite small anyway.  
 
My last hypothesis was that closeness of election should affects voting through interest in the 
election (H5). Although the results from the mediation analysis lends support, the limitations 
make it too difficult to reject the null hypothesis. The two-level regression models used for the 
estimation seemed to influence by the intra-district dependencies. Contrary to the three-level 
regression model that accounted for this, the two-level model had a statistically significant 
coefficient for closeness of election. This is probably because the model underestimates the 
standard errors by not accounting for the intra-group dependencies. Although the ACME 
procedure uses robust standard errors, the end result is probably very biased because of this. 
This in addition to that I cannot test sensitivity for the sequential ignorability assumption, means 
that I regard it as inconclusive. 
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6.2 Conclusion 
 
That close elections increase turnout at the aggregate-level is arguably the most consistent 
finding in the turnout literature. However, individual-level studies rather consistently tend not 
to find any connection between the closeness of an election and someone’s decision to vote. 
Although we know that more people tend to vote in a closer election, we lack an empirical 
foundation for why that might be. The aim of this thesis was to uncover the reason for this 
seemingly puzzling inconsistency. Ferejohn and Fiorina (1975: 920) declared that “closeness 
counts only in horseshoes and dancing”. Instead of asking if closeness of election affects the 
decision to vote, I therefore went searching for horseshoes: When does closeness count? More 
specifically, I asked for whom. My rationale was that closeness of election might affect the 
decision to vote by different mechanisms for different people. In other words, that closeness 
only counts for some. Using the developmental framework of voting, the resources model of 
participation and the heuristic-systematic model of information processing, I argue that interest 
and habit are two integral parts of the equation. I proposed five different hypotheses for whom 
closeness might count and why that is. I hypothesize that (i) although closeness of election only 
can affect those without a habit of voting; (ii) it fuels cognitive engagement for those that are 
interested in the election; and (iii) it fuels interested in the election for those who are educated 
or (iv) feel close to a particular party. It should also (v) affect the decision to vote indirectly 
through interest in the election. To test these hypotheses I used multilevel regression models 
and mediation analysis on cross-national survey data from the CSES. I also calculated closeness 
of election in a way so that it is comparable across different electoral systems by combining 
district- and national-level margins. The results lend clear support for hypotheses i-iv. The 
results indicate an intricate relationship between the closeness of election, interest and habit. 
While closeness may help shape participation by altering the role of interest, habit shapes the 
role of closeness of election. Closeness of election can work as electoral supply of opportunity, 
but only in the right circumstances. The results clearly supports this notion that closeness of 
elections can affect the decision to vote, sometimes. Indeed, the regression models indicate no 
statistically significant relationship when looking at the mean, only when examining the 
conditional relationships. The reason most individual-level studies do not find any link, is that 
they do not look. 
 
My thesis makes two general contribution to the turnout literature. Firstly by proposing to 
measure district- and national-level closeness simultaneously. There have been a push towards 
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the use of district-level as opposed to national-level measures, but for some reason this 
proposition of combining them have not been discussed in the literature. Secondly by giving an 
empirical foundation for the role of closeness of election in shaping participation. Although the 
scope tested here is narrow, the results support a broader idea: Closeness of election affects 
participation by different mechanisms for different people. Arguing that some aggregate-level 
change is due to a change in the universal decision calculus really says very little about very 
little.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
  87 
7. LITERATURE 
 
Aarts H and Dijksterhuis A. (2000) Habits as knowledge structures: automaticity in goal-
directed behavior. Journal of personality and social psychology 78: 53. 
Abramson PR and Claggett W. (2001) Recruitment and political participation. Political 
Research Quarterly 54: 905-916. 
Akaike H. (1998) Information theory and an extension of the maximum likelihood principle. 
Selected Papers of Hirotugu Akaike. Springer, 199-213. 
Aldrich JH. (1993) Rational Choice and Turnout. American Journal of Political Science 37: 
246-278. 
Aldrich JH, Montgomery JM and Wood W. (2011) Turnout as Habit. Political Behaviour 33: 
535-565. 
Ansolabehere S and Iyengar S. (1995) Going negative: How political advertising shrinks and 
polarizes the electorate. New York: Free Press. 
Ansolabehere S and Snyder Jr JM. (2000) Soft money, hard money, strong parties. Colum. L. 
Rev. 100: 598. 
Arceneaux K and Nickerson DW. (2009) Who is mobilized to vote? A re-analysis of 11 field 
experiments. American Journal of Political Science 53: 1-16. 
Ashenfelter O and Kelley Jr S. (1975) Determinants of participation in presidential elections. 
JL & Econ. 18: 695. 
Bandura A. (1977) Self-efficacy: toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychological 
review 84: 191. 
Bargh J. (1999) The Four Horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, intention, efficiency, and 
control in social cognition, Wyer RS, Jr., Srull TK, Handbook of social cognition, 1994, 
1-40. Erlbaum, Hillsdale. 
Baron RM and Kenny DA. (1986) The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social 
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of 
personality and social psychology 51: 1173. 
Bartels LM. (1985) Resource allocation in a presidential campaign. The Journal of Politics 47: 
928-936. 
Basinger SJ and Lavine H. (2005) Ambivalence, information, and electoral choice. American 
Political Science Review 99: 169-184. 
Bates D, Maechler M and Dai B. (2008) The lme4 package. Computer software manual]. 
Retrieved from http://cran. r-project. org/web/packages/lme4/lme4. pdf. 
Berelson BR. (1954) Voting: A study of opinion formation in a presidential campaign: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Bernstein R, Chadha A and Montjoy R. (2001) Overreporting voting: Why it happens and why 
it matters. Public Opinion Quarterly 65: 22-44. 
Berry FS and Berry WD. (1991) Specifying a model of state policy innovation. The American 
Political Science Review: 571-579. 
Berry WD, DeMeritt JH and Esarey J. (2010) Testing for interaction in binary logit and probit 
models: is a product term essential? American Journal of Political Science 54: 248-266. 
Birch S. (2010) Perceptions of electioral fairness and voter turnout. Comparativ Political Studes 
43: 1601-1622. 
Blais A. (2000) To vote to not to vote: The merits and limits of rational choice theory, 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Blais A. (2006) What affects voter turnout? Annual Review of Political Science 9: 111-125. 
Blais A and Dobrzynska A. (1998) Turnout in electoral democracies. European Journal of 
Political Research 33: 239-261. 
   
  88 
Blais A and Lago I. (2009) A general measure of district competitiveness. Electoral Studies 28: 
94-100. 
Blais A and Rubenson D. (2013) The Source of Turnout Decline New Values or New Contexts? 
Comparative Political Studies 46: 95-117. 
Bowler S and Grofman B. (2000) Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single 
Transferable Vote: Reflections on an embedded institution: University of Michigan 
Press. 
Brady HE and Collier D. (2010) Rethinking social inquiry: Diverse tools, shared standards: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Brady HE, Verba S and Schlozman KL. (1995) Beyond Ses: A Resource Model of Political 
Participation. The American Political Science Review 89: 271-294. 
Brambor T, Clark WR and Golder M. (2006) Understanding interaction models: Improving 
empirical analyses. Political Analysis 14: 63-82. 
Brody RA and Sniderman PM. (1977) From life space to polling place: The relevance of 
personal concerns for voting behavior. British Journal of Political Science 7: 337-360. 
Bryk A and Raudenbush S. (1992) Hierarchical linear models: Applications and data analysis 
methods. Sage, Newbury Park, CA. 
Bullock JG and Ha SE. (2011) Mediation analysis is harder than it looks. Cambridge handbook 
of experimental political science: 508-521. 
Burnham WD. (1965) The changing shape of the American political universe. American 
Political Science Review 59: 7-28. 
Burt RS. (2000) The network structure of social capital. Research in organizational behavior 
22: 345-423. 
Bühlmann M and Freitag M. (2006) Individual and contextual determinants of electioral 
participation. Swiss Political Science Review 12: 13-47. 
Cacioppo JT, Petty RE, Feinstein JA, et al. (1996) Dispositional differences in cognitive 
motivation: The life and times of individuals varying in need for cognition. 
Psychological bulletin 119: 197. 
Caldeira GA and Patterson SC. (1982) Contextual influences on participation in US state 
legislative elections. Legislative Studies Quarterly: 359-381. 
Caldeira GA, Patterson SC and Markko GA. (1985) The mobilization of voters in congressional 
elections. The Journal of Politics 47: 490-509. 
Cann DM and Cole JB. (2011) Strategic campaigning, closeness, and voter mobilization in US 
Presidential elections. Electoral Studies 30: 344-352. 
Chaiken S. (1980) Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source 
versus message cues in persuasion. Journal of personality and social psychology 39: 
752. 
Chaiken S. (1987) The heuristic model of persuasion. Social influence: The ontario symposium. 
3-39. 
Chaiken S, Liberman A and Eagly AH. (1989) Heuristic and systematic information processing 
within and beyond the persuasion context. 
Chen S and Chaiken S. (1999) The heuristic-systematic model in its broader context. Dual-
process theories in social psychology: 73-96. 
Chen S, Duckworth K and Chaiken S. (1999) Motivated heuristic and systematic processing. 
Psychological Inquiry 10: 44-49. 
Chen S, Shechter D and Chaiken S. (1996) Getting at the truth or getting along: Accuracy-
versus impression-motivated heuristic and systematic processing. Journal of personality 
and social psychology 71: 262. 
Cho WKT, Manski CF, Brady H, et al. (2008) Cross level/ecological inference. Oxford 
Handbook of Political Methodology: 547-569. 
   
  89 
Clarke P and Evans SH. (1983) Covering campaigns: Journalism in congressional elections: 
Stanford University Press. 
Collier D, Brady HE and Seawright J. (2004) Sources of leverage in causal inference: Toward 
an alternative view of methodology. Rethinking social inquiry: Diverse tools, shared 
standards: 229-266. 
Converse PE. (1962) Information flow and the stability of partisan attitudes. Public Opinion 
Quarterly 26: 578-599. 
Cox GW. (1988) Closeness and turnout: A methodological note. The Journal of Politics 50: 
768-775. 
Cox GW. (1999) Electoral rules and the calculus of voting. Legislative Studies Quarterly 24: 
387-419. 
Cox GW and Munger MC. (1989) Closeness, Expenditure, and Turnout in the 1982 U.S. House 
Elections. American Political Science Review 83: 217-233. 
Cravens MD. (2013) The role of habit in voting: making and breaking habitual voters. 
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA. 
CSES. (2013) CSES MODULE 3 FULL RELEASE. In: Systems TCSoE (ed) March 27, 2013 
version ed. 
Curtice J. (2007) Comparative opinion surveys. I Russel J. Dalton & Hans-Dieter Klingemann 
(red.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior: 896-909. 
Cutts D, Fieldhouse E and John P. (2009) Is voting habit forming? The longitudinal impact of 
a GOTV campaign in the UK. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 19: 
251-263. 
Dalton RJ. (2008) Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial 
democracies, Washington: CQ Press. 
De Paola M and Scoppa V. (2013) The impact of closeness on electoral participation exploiting 
the Italian double ballot system. Public Choice: 1-13. 
Deaton AS. (2010) Understanding the mechanisms of economic development. National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Denny K and Doyle O. (2008) Political interest, cognitive ability and personality: Determinants 
of voter turnout in Britain. British Journal of Political Science 38: 291-310. 
Denny K and Doyle O. (2009) Does voting history matter? Analysing persistence in turnout. 
American Journal of Political Science 53: 17-35. 
Denver DT and Hands G. (1974) Marginality and turnout in British general elections. British 
Journal of Political Science 4: 17-35. 
Denzau AT and Munger MC. (1986) Legislators and interest groups: How unorganized interests 
get represented. The American Political Science Review: 89-106. 
Dinas E. (2012) The formation of voting habits. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties 
22: 431-456. 
Downs A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper. 
Erdmann G and Kneuer M. (2011) Regression of Democracy?: Springer. 
Erikson RS and Palfrey TR. (2000) Equilibria in campaign spending games: Theory and data. 
American Political Science Review: 595-609. 
Farrell D and McAllister I. (2003) Electoral systems. The Cambridge Handbook of Social 
Sciences in Australia: 287. 
Fauvelle-Aymar C and François A. (2006) The impact of closeness on turnout: An empirical 
relation based on a study of a two-round ballot. Public Choice 127: 461-483. 
Felchner ME. (2008) Voting in America: Greenwood Publishing Group. 
Ferejohn JA and Fiorina MP. (1975) Closeness counts only in horseshoes and dancing. The 
American Political Science Review: 920-925. 
   
  90 
Fieldhouse E, Tranmer M and Russel A. (2007) Something about young people or something 
about elections? Electoral participation of young people in Europe: Evidence from a 
multilevel analysis of the European Social Survey. European Journal of Political 
Research 46: 797-822. 
Fiske ST and Taylor SE. (2013) Social cognition: From brains to culture: Sage. 
Fowler JH. (2006) Habitual voting and behavioral turnout. Journal of Politics 68: 335-344. 
Franklin MN. (2002) The dynamics of electoral participation. In: LeDuc L, Niemie RG and 
Norris P (eds) Comparing democracies 2: New challenges in the study of elections and 
voting. London: Sage Publications, 148-166. 
Franklin MN. (2004) Voter turnout and the dynamics of electoral competition in established 
democracies since 1945, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Franklin MN, Lyons P and Marsh M. (2004) Generational basis of turnout decline in established 
democracies. Acta Politica 39: 115-151. 
Franz MM, Freedman P, Goldstein K, et al. (2008) Understanding the effect of political 
advertising on voter turnout: A response to Krasno and Green. The Journal of Politics 
70: 262-268. 
Franzese R and Kam C. (2009) Modeling and interpreting interactive hypotheses in regression 
analysis: University of Michigan Press. 
Fujiwara T, Meng KC and Vogl T. (2013) Estimating Habit Formation in Voting. National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Gallagher M. (1991) Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems. Electoral 
Studies 10: 33-51. 
Gallagher M. (1992) Comparing proportional representation electoral systems: Quotas, 
thresholds, paradoxes and majorities. British Journal of Political Science 22: 469-496. 
Gallego A. (2010) Understanding unequal turnout: Education and voting in comparative 
perspective. Electoral Studies 29: 239-248. 
Garmann S. (2014) A note on electoral competition and turnout in run-off electoral systems: 
Taking into account both endogeneity and attenuation bias. Electoral Studies: An 
international Journal: 261-265. 
Gelman A, King G and Boscardin WJ. (1998) Estimating the probability of events that have 
never occurred: when is your vote decisive? Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 93: 1-9. 
Gerber AS and Green DP. (2000) The effects of canvassing, telephone calls, and direct mail on 
voter turnout: A field experiment. American Political Science Review: 653-663. 
Gerber AS, Green DP and Shachar R. (2003) Voting May Be Habit-Forming: Evidence from a 
Randomized Field Experiment. American Journal of Political Science 47: 540-550. 
Geys B. (2006) Explaining voter turnout: A review of aggregate-level research. Electoral 
Studies 25: 637-663. 
Gimpel JG, Kaufmann KM and Pearson‐Merkowitz S. (2007) Battleground states versus 
blackout states: The behavioral implications of modern presidential campaigns. Journal 
of Politics 69: 786-797. 
Goldstein H. (2011) Multilevel statistical models: John Wiley & Sons. 
Goldstein KM and Ridout TN. (2002) The politics of participation: Mobilization and turnout 
over time. Political Behavior 24: 3-29. 
Górecki MA. (2011) Electoral salience and vote overreporting: Another look at the problem of 
validity in voter turnout studies. International Journal of Public Opinion Research 23: 
544-557. 
Granberg D and Holmberg S. (1991) Self-reported turnout and voter validation. American 
Journal of Political Science 35: 448-459. 
   
  91 
Green DP, Ha SE and Bullock JG. (2010) Enough already about “black box” experiments: 
Studying mediation is more difficult than most scholars suppose. The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 628: 200-208. 
Green DP and Shachar R. (2000) Habit formation and political behaviour: Evidence of 
consuetude in voter turnout. British Journal of Political Science 30: 561-573. 
Grier KB and Munger MC. (1991) Committee assignments, constituent preferences, and 
campaign contributions. Economic Inquiry 29: 24-43. 
Grier KB and Munger MC. (1993) Comparing interest group PAC contributions to House and 
Senate incumbents, 1980–1986. The Journal of Politics 55: 615-643. 
Grofman B and Selb P. (2009) A fully general index of political competition. Electoral Studies 
28: 291-296. 
Hadjar A and Beck M. (2010) Who does not participate in elections in Europe and why is this? 
European Societies 12: 521-542. 
Heckman JJ and Smith JA. (1995) Assessing the case for social experiments. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives: 85-110. 
Hill D and McKee SC. (2005) The electoral college, mobilization, and turnout in the 2000 
presidential election. American Politics Research 33: 700-725. 
Hobolt SB, Spoon J-J and Tilley J. (2009) A vote against Europe? Explaining defection at the 
1999 and 2004 European Parliament elections. British Journal of Political Science 39: 
93-115. 
Holbrook AL and Krosnick JA. (2012) Social desirability bias in voter turnout reports: Testing 
using the item count technique. Public Opinion Quarterly 74: 37-67. 
Hox J. (2010) Multilevel analysis: Techniques and applications: Routledge Academic. 
Huckfeldt R and Sprague J. (1992) Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: Political 
Structure, Social Structure, and the Party Canvass. American Political Science Review 
86: 70-86. 
Imai K, Keele L and Tingley D. (2010a) A general approach to causal mediation analysis. 
Psychological methods 15: 309. 
Imai K, Keele L, Tingley D, et al. (2011) Unpacking the black box of causality: Learning about 
causal mechanisms from experimental and observational studies. American Political 
Science Review 105: 765-789. 
Imai K, Keele L and Yamamoto T. (2010b) Identification, inference and sensitivity analysis for 
causal mediation effects. Statistical Science: 51-71. 
Imai K and Yamamoto T. (2013) Identification and sensitivity analysis for multiple causal 
mechanisms: Revisiting evidence from framing experiments. Political Analysis 21: 141-
171. 
Indridason IH. (2008) Competition & turnout: the majority run-off as a natural experiment. 
Electoral Studies 27: 699-710. 
Jackman RW. (1987) Political institutions and voter turnout in the industrial democracies. The 
American Political Science Review: 405-423. 
Jackman RW and Miller RA. (1995) Voter turnout in the industrial democracies during the 
1980s. Comparativ Political Studes 27: 467-492. 
Jackson RA. (1996) The mobilization of congressional electorates. Legislative Studies 
Quarterly: 425-445. 
Jackson RA. (1997) The mobilization of US state electorates in the 1988 and 1990 elections. 
The Journal of Politics 59: 520-537. 
Jackson RA. (2002) Gubernatorial and Senatorial Camapaign Mobilization of Voters. Political 
Research Quarterly 55: 825-844. 
Johnston R, Matthews JS and Bittner A. (2006) Alienation, indifference, competitiveness, and 
turnout: Evidence from Canada, 1988–2004. Electoral Studies 26: 735-745. 
   
  92 
Kagan J. (1972) Motives and development. Journal of personality and social psychology 22: 
51. 
Kam CD and Utych SM. (2011) Close elections and cognitive engagement. The Journal of 
Politics 73: 1251-1266. 
Kanazawa S. (1998) A possible solution to the paradox of voter turnout. The Journal of Politics 
60: 974-995. 
Kanazawa S. (2000) A new solution to the collective action problem: The paradox of voter 
turnout. American Sociological Review: 433-442. 
Karp JA and Brockington D. (2005) Social desirability and response validity: A comparative 
analysis of overreporting voter turnout in five countries. The Journal of Politics 67: 825-
840. 
Kelley S, Ayres RE and Bowen WG. (1967) Registration and voting: Putting first things first. 
The American Political Science Review: 359-379. 
Kenny CB. (1992) Political participation and effects from the social environment. American 
Journal of Political Science: 259-267. 
Key V. (1949) Southern politics in state and nation. 
King G, Tomz M and Wittenberg J. (2000) Making the most of statistical analyses: Improving 
interpretation and presentation. American Journal of Political Science: 347-361. 
Kirchgässner G and Schulz T. (2005) Expected closeness or mobilisation: why do voters go to 
the polls?: Empirical results for Switzerland, 1981-1999. CESifo working papers. 
Kittilson MC and Anderson CJ. (2011) Electoral Supply and Voter Engagement. In: Dalton RJ 
and Anderson CJ (eds) Citizens, Context, and Choice: How Context Shapes Citizens' 
Electoral Choices. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kramer GH. (1970) The effects of precinct-level canvassing on voter behavior. Public Opinion 
Quarterly 34: 560-572. 
Krasno JS and Green DP. (2008) Do televised presidential ads increase voter turnout? Evidence 
from a natural experiment. The Journal of Politics 70: 245-261. 
Langer EJ. (1975) The illusion of control. Journal of personality and social psychology 32: 
311. 
Lavine HG, Johnston CD and Steenbergen MR. (2012) The ambivalent partisan: How critical 
loyalty promotes democracy: Oxford University Press. 
Lijphart A. (1997) Unequal participation: democracy's unresolved dilemma. American Political 
Science Review: 1-14. 
Lijphart A and Grofman B. (1984) Choosing an electoral system. Issues and Alternatives. New 
York. 
Loewenstein G. (1994) The psychology of curiosity: A review and reinterpretation. 
Psychological bulletin 116: 75. 
Luke DA. (2004) Multilevel modeling, London: Sage Publications. 
Lupia A and McCubbins MD. (1998) The democratic dilemma. Can Citizens learn what they 
need to know. 
MacKinnon DP. (2008) Introduction to statistical mediation analysis: Routledge. 
Masser BM, White KM, Hyde MK, et al. (2008) The psychology of blood donation: current 
research and future directions. Transfusion medicine reviews 22: 215-233. 
Matsusaka JG and Palda F. (1993) The Downsian voter meets the ecological fallacy. Public 
Choice 77: 855-878. 
Matsusaka JG and Palda F. (1999) Voter turnout: How much can we explain? Public Choice 
98: 431-446. 
Mc Culloch KC, Aarts H, Fujita K, et al. (2008) Inhibition in goal systems: A retrieval-induced 
forgetting account. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44: 857-865. 
   
  93 
McClurg SD. (2004) Indirect Mobilization The Social Consequences of Party Contacts in an 
Election Campaign. American Politics Research 32: 406-443. 
Menard S. (2002) Applied logistic regression analysis: Sage. 
Meredith M. (2009) Persistence in political participation. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 
4: 187-209. 
Milbrath LW. (1965) Political participation: How and why do people get involved in politics? 
Milne GR and McDonald MA. (1999) Sport marketing: Managing the exchange process: Jones 
& Bartlett Learning. 
Moyser G and Day N. (1992) Political participation and democracy in Britain: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mulligan CB and Hunter CG. (2003) The empirical frequency of a pivotal vote. Public Choice 
116: 31-54. 
Nagler J. (1991) The effect of registration laws and education on US voter turnout. The 
American Political Science Review: 1393-1405. 
Nagler J and Leighley J. (1992) Presidential campaign expenditures: Evidence on allocations 
and effects. Public Choice 73: 319-333. 
Neal DT, Wood W, Labrecque JS, et al. (2012) How do habits guide behavior? Perceived and 
actual triggers of habits in daily life. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48: 
492-498. 
Neal DT, Wood W and Quinn JM. (2006) Habits—A repeat performance. Current Directions 
in Psychological Science 15: 198-202. 
Nie NH and Verba S. (1987) Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Norris P. (2004) Electoral engineering: Voting rules and political behaviour, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ouellette JA and Wood W. (1998) Habit and intention in everyday life: the multiple processes 
by which past behavior predicts future behavior. Psychological bulletin 124: 54. 
Owen G and Grofman B. (1984) To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvoting. Public 
Choice 42: 311-325. 
Patterson SC and Caldeira GA. (1983) Getting out the vote: Participation in gubernatorial 
elections. The American Political Science Review: 675-689. 
Pearl J. (2000) Causality: models, reasoning and inference: Cambridge Univ Press. 
Persson M. (2012) Is the effect of education on voter turnout absolute or relative? A multi-level 
analysis of 37 countries. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties. 
Persson M. (2013) Is the effect of education on voter turnout absolute or relative? A multi-level 
analysis of 37 countries. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties 23: 111-133. 
Plutzer E. (2002) Becoming a habitual voter: Inertia, resources and growth in young adulthood. 
American Political Science Review 96: 41-56. 
Powell Jr GB. (1986) American voter turnout in comparative perspective. The American 
Political Science Review: 17-43. 
Presson PK and Benassi VA. (1996) Illusion of control: A meta-analytic review. Journal of 
Social Behavior & Personality. 
Przeworski A and Teune H. (1970) The logic of comparative social inquiry. 
Quinn JM, Pascoe A, Wood W, et al. (2010) Can’t control yourself? Monitor those bad habits. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36: 499-511. 
Rabe-Hesketh S and Skrondal A. (2008) Multilevel and longitudinal modeling using Stata: 
STATA press. 
Rainey C. (2014) Compression and Conditional Effects. Working Paper. Accessed June 5. 
Riker WH and Ordeshook PC. (1968) A theory of the calculus of voting. The American Political 
Science Review 62: 25-42. 
   
  94 
Robinson W. (1950) Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals. American 
Sociological Review: 351-357. 
Rosenstone S and Hansen JM. (1993) Mobilization, participation and democracy in America. 
Rubenson D, Blais A, Fournier P, et al. (2004) Accounting for the age gap in turnout. Acta 
Politica 39: 407-421. 
Rubin DB. (1974) Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and nonrandomized 
studies. Journal of educational Psychology 66: 688. 
Rubin DB. (2004) Direct and Indirect Causal Effects via Potential Outcomes*. Scandinavian 
Journal of Statistics 31: 161-170. 
Schwarz G. (1978) Estimating the dimension of a model. The annals of statistics 6: 461-464. 
Selb P. (2009) A Deeper Look at the Proportionality—Turnout Nexus. Comparative Political 
Studies 42: 527-548. 
Shachar R and Nalebuff B. (1999) Follow the leader: Theory and evidence on political 
participation. American Economic Review: 525-547. 
Shadish WR, Cook TD and Campbell DT. (2002) Experimental and quasi-experimental designs 
for generalized causal inference: Wadsworth Cengage learning. 
Shaw DR. (1999) The methods behind the madness: Presidential Electoral College strategies, 
1988–1996. The Journal of Politics 61: 893-913. 
Shaw DR. (2008) The race to 270: The electoral college and the campaign strategies of 2000 
and 2004: University of Chicago Press. 
Shugan SM. (1980) The cost of thinking. Journal of consumer Research: 99-111. 
Sigelman L and Kugler M. (2003) Why is research on the effects of negative campaigning so 
inconclusive? Understanding citizens’ perceptions of negativity. Journal of Politics 65: 
142-160. 
Silver BD, Anderson BA and Abramson PR. (1986) Who overreports voting? The American 
Political Science Review 80: 613-624. 
Simonovits G. (2012) Competition and turnout revisited: the importance of measuring expected 
closeness accurately. Electoral Studies 31: 364-371. 
Singh S. (2011a) Contradictory calculi: Differences in individuals' turnout decisions across 
electoral systems. Political Research Quarterly 64: 646-655. 
Singh S. (2011b) How compelling is compulsory voting? A multilevel analysis of turnout. 
Political Behaviour 33: 95-111. 
Smets K and Ham Cv. (2013) The embarrassment of riches? A meta-analysis of individual-
level research on voter turnout. Electoral Studies. 
Smith ER. (1984) Model of social inference processes. Psychological review 91: 392. 
Snijder TAB and Bosker RJ. (2004) Multilevel Analysis: An introduction to basic and advanced 
multilevel modeling, London: Sage Publications. 
Splawa-Neyman J, Dabrowska D and Speed T. (1990) On the application of probability theory 
to agricultural experiments. Essay on principles. Section 9. Statistical Science 5: 465-
472. 
Stevens JP. (2012) Applied multivariate statistics for the social sciences: Routledge. 
Söderlund P, Wass H and Blais A. (2011) The impact of motivational and contextual factores 
on turnout in first- and second-order elections. Electoral Studies 30: 689-699. 
Tawfik A, Sciarini P and Horber E. (2012) Putting voter turnout in a longitudinal and contextual 
perspective: An analysis of actual participation data. International Political Science 
Review 33: 352-371. 
Teixeira RA. (1992) The disappearing American voter: Brookings Institution Press. 
Tiedens LZ and Linton S. (2001) Judgment under emotional certainty and uncertainty: the 
effects of specific emotions on information processing. Journal of personality and 
social psychology 81: 973. 
   
  95 
Tingley D, Yamamoto T, Hirose K, et al. (2013) mediation: R package for causal mediation 
analysis. R package version 4. 
Trivedi CCAPK. (2010) Microeconometrics Using Stata. Stata Press. 
van der Eijk C, Franklin M and Marsh M. (1996) What voters teach us about europe-wide 
elections: what europe-wide elections teach us about voters. Electoral Studies 15: 149-
166. 
van Egmond MH. (2003) Rain falls on all of us (but some manage to get more wet than others): 
political context and electoral participation. 
Verba S, Schlozman KL and Brady HE. (1995) Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in 
American politics: Cambridge Univ Press. 
Verplanken B and Aarts H. (1999) Habit, attitude, and planned behaviour: is habit an empty 
construct or an interesting case of goal-directed automaticity? European review of social 
psychology 10: 101-134. 
Verplanken B, Aarts H and Van Knippenberg A. (1997) Habit, information acquisition, and the 
process of making travel mode choices. European Journal of Social Psychology 27: 
539-560. 
Verplanken B and Orbell S. (2003) Reflections on Past Behavior: A Self‐Report Index of Habit 
Strength1. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 33: 1313-1330. 
Wattenberg MP. (2002) Where have all the voters gone?: Harvard University Press. 
Wattenberg MP and Brians CL. (1999) Negative campaign advertising: Demobilizer or 
mobilizer? American Political Science Review: 891-899. 
Weary G and Jacobson JA. (1997) Causal uncertainty beliefs and diagnostic information 
seeking. Journal of personality and social psychology 73: 839. 
Wielhouwer PW. (1999) The mobilization of campaign activists by the party canvass. American 
Politics Research 27: 177-200. 
Wielhouwer PW. (2003) In Search of Lincoln's Perfect List Targeting in Grassroots Campaigns. 
American Politics Research 31: 632-669. 
Wielhouwer PW and Lockerbie B. (1994) Party contacting and political participation, 1952-90. 
American Journal of Political Science: 211-229. 
Wolfinger RE and Rosenstone S. (1980) Who votes?: Yale University Press. 
Wood W and Neal DT. (2007) A new look at habits and the habit-goal interface. Psychological 
review 114: 843. 
Wood W and Neal DT. (2009) The habitual consumer. Journal of Consumer Psychology 19: 
579-592. 
Zipp JF. (1985) Perceived representatives and voting: an assessment of the impact of “choices” 
vs.“echoes”. American Political Science Review 79: 50-61. 
 
  
   
  96 
8. APPENDIX 
 
Plots of residuals and fitted values for the linear regression model (Model 3.2). 
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